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The "new regionalism"' of the last decade shows a turn away from
regional groupings (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),2 the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)3 and Free Trade of
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I. The "new regionalism" of the last decade has been described as a response to frustration
countries feel at the slow and blocked progress in multilateral trade liberalization through the Doha Round
and their belief that free trade agreements can be used for the required economic liberalization. United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York and Geneva, Trade and Development Report
2007,54, UNCTAD/TDR/2007(Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2007-en.pdf
(last visited Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007].
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) characterizes this new regionalism
from the perspective of developing countries as having two basic characteristics: 1) bypassing multilateralism
(in the institutions and arrangements) to pursue economic perspective; and 2) adopting the idea that
successful integration into the world economy requires "access to the markets of the North and attracting FDI
from developed country investors." Id. at 55.
If this is a new wave of regionalism it would be the third wave of such efforts since the beginning of
the world trading system. See NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 3-4 (Jamie De Melo & Arvind
Panagriya eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) (describing the first wave ofregionalism as coming in the early
1960s, following the European Common market, and the second wave starting in the middle 1980s, when the
United States became a major player by into entering into free trade agreements with Israel, Canada and
Mexico); see also World Trade Organization (WTO), World Trade Report 2007, at 306 (2007), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res e/bookspe/anrepe/worldtradereport07 e.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2009)
[hereinafter WORLD TRADE REPORT 2007] (noting that the second wave ofregionalism came when the United
States negotiated the U.S.-Canada FTA and began a shift from multilateralism to regionalism).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
(containing chs. 1-9), 32 I.L.M. 605 (containing chs. 10-22) [hereinafter NAFTA].
3. MERCOSUR is the short form for the Mercado Commn del Sur (Common Market of the
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the Americas (FTAA)4 ) towards the negotiation and implementation of more
bilateral arrangements. These bilateral agreements have proliferated worldwide
but many of them involve North-South arrangements between developed and
developing countries.5 The European Community (EC) and the U.S. lead' in
the formation of these newer bilateral free trade agreements. The United States
only negotiates and enters into free trade agreements (FTA). Since the time of
the NAFTA negotiations, the United States has developed and refined a model
free trade agreement7 that pursues all of its U.S. goals on deep economic
integration.
This article will focus on the recent past and future of the U.S. approach
to regionalism. In doing so, it will begin with an analysis of why the pursuit of
free trade agreements has become the vehicle of choice' for U.S. trade
liberalization. This analysis will set forth the form and contours of the U.S.
approach to negotiating free trade agreements as well as the development of the
model FTA. The second part of the article will detail the impact of the U.S.
approach on its free trade partners-the developing countries-that have
completed negotiations with the United States. The third section of the article
South). MERCOSUR entered into force in 1992 following the adoption of the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991.
Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Ura., Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M.1041 (1991).
4. The Free Trade Area of the Americas initiative was launched in 1994 with a goal of creating
a free trade area uniting all of the 34 democracies in the Western Hemisphere. The negotiating process for
the FTAA went on until 2005 and created multiple drafts before it was suspended in 2005. The United States
has taken the position that "[o]ther leaders indicated that the conditions did not exist for the achievement of
the FTAA." World Trade Organization (WTO), Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review Report by
the United States, WT/TPR/G/200 (May 5, 2008), available at www.wto.org/english/tratope/tpre/
g200_e.doc (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter US/TPR]. For an analysis of the reasons why the FTAA
failed to materialize, see David A. Gantz, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come-and Gone?, 1 LOY. INT'L L. REv. 179 (2004) [hereinafter Gantz, Free Trade Area].
5. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 55 (noting that the North-South
bilateral free trade agreements have increased from 14% of the world wide number reported to the WTO in
1995 to 27% in 2007).
6. Id. at 55-56 (describing the reasons for the increase in negotiations of bilateral free trade
agreements by the EC and U.S.). See also Chris Brummer, The Ties the Bind? Regionalism, Commercial
Treaties, and the Future of Global Economic Integration, 60 VAND. L. REv. 1349, 1364 (2007) (detailing
the numbers of bilateral FTAs negotiated by the European Community (E.C.) and the United States).
7. The United States has completed fifteen free trade agreements, thirteen of which have been
implemented in the United States and its partner countries. All of these agreements, except for NAFTA and
the Central American Free Trade Agreement CAFTA/DR have been bilateral FTAs. By contrast, the EC has
used regional agreements for the different purposes. It has used association agreements to prepare countries
forjoining the EC common market (a customs union). The EC has negotiated bilateral free trade agreements
with developing countries. Most recently it has focused on a long process of replacing its prior preference
programs for its former colonial trading partners in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries with
Economic Partnerships Agreements (EPAs). TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007, supra note I, at 56.
8. See discussion infra Part IB.A.
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focuses on how the United States could improve by looking at other models and
by altering its approach to both the design and the negotiations for future free
trade agreements.
I. THE RECENT PATTERN OF U.S. REGIONALISM
The United States has developed an entire system for negotiating
economic integration agreements over the last two decades.9 Before the 1980s,
the United States focused more on multilateralism and unilateralism than
regionalism."t The United States has developed four approaches to economic
integration. The lowest level are Trade and Investment Framework Agreements
(TIFAs)," setting out general principles on free trade and investment. The
TIFAs are often used as precursors to either Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BIT) 2 or Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) (pursued on a regional basis, largely
9. Susan G. Esserman, Proceeding of the Canada-United States Law Institute Conference on
Understanding Each Other Across the Largest Undefended Border in History: U.S. Speaker, 31 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 11, 13 (2005).
10. The United States was actually the biggest defender of the multilateral system. See Jagdish
Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION,
supra note 1, at 29.
The United States later shifted to what could be considered aggressive regionalism. According to
Bhagwati, this shift was due to a number of factors including: the belief that the GATT was inadequate; that
multilateral negotiations were moving too slowly; and, that regionalism in North America would constitute
a countervailing bloc to the Europe 1992 drive to complete the single market. Id. at 29, 30. See also Jagdish
Bhagwati, The Diminished Giant Syndrome: How Declinism Drives Trade Policy, FOREIGN AFF. (Council
on Foreign Relations), Spring 1993, at 22.
The U.S. move towards regionalism sped up when the Uruguay Round negotiations broke down in
1990 over an impasse between the United States and the European Community regarding agriculture issues.
President George H.W. Bush's response to this stalemate was to move more decisively to pursue negotiations
with Mexico and Canada for a free trade agreement. See C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and
Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA TurnedInto a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 2,9-10
(1994) [hereinafterNAFTAlBattle]. Once NAFTA was completed, the Clinton Administration continued the
pursuit of regionalism and that process intensified under President George W. Bush. See discussion infra
Part II.
11. The United States currently has Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) in place.
TIFAs cover general agreements between the United States and its partners on an investment protections,
intellectual property issues, customs improvements and transparency (for government and commercial
regulations). The United States offers TIFAs to many of the countries that later become FTA partners. For
example, the United States had TIFAs and later FrAs with the following countries: Australia, Bahrain,
Singapore and one regional TIFA with the the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.
See OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP. (USTR), TRADE AND INvESTMENT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS (TIFAs)
(2004), http://www.sice.oas.org/TPDUSAOMN/Negotiations/07072004TUFA-e.pdf (last visited Feb. 18,
2009).
12. The United States has over 40 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in place. Of its current FTA
partners, the following countries were also BIT countries: Bahrain, Honduras, Jordan, Morocco, and Panama.
See TRADE COMPLIANCE CENTER, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, available at
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through regional trade initiatives such as NAFTA, the Enterprise for ASEAN
Initiative (EAI)"3 and the FTA) or bilateral FTAs. Current regional initiatives
cover every major continent or region,"' except for Europe. Bilateral free trade
agreements have spun off these regional initiatives or have been pursued with
individual countries.' 5
http://tcc.export.gov/TradeAgreements/BilateralInvestmentTreaties/index.asp (last visited Feb. 18,2009).
Over the years, the United States has developed a model BIT which it uses when it negotiates with partner
countries. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND RELATED AGREEMENTS, 2004 U.S.
MODELBIT(2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601 .pdf(link to 2004 U.S. Model BIT
found on U.S. Department of State website) (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
13. Under the terms of the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) with the ASEAN countries of
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam,
the United States offered agreements to any country committed to U.S. free trade goals which was both a
World Trade Organization (WTO) member and a TIFA signatory. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (USTR),
ENTERPRISE FOR ASEAN INITIATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Regional/Enterprise_
forASEANInitiative/SectionIndex.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
The EAI was launched in 2002 and produced the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement. United States-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026, available at http://www.ustr.
gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/FinalTexts/SectionIndex.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
The United States has also entered into negotiations with Malaysia and Thailand for bilateral free trade
agreements. US/TPR, supra note 4, at 20-22.
14. All of the regional initiatives were launched in either 2002 or 2003. In addition to the EAI
(Asia), the United States began initiatives in Africa with the South African Customs Union (SACU), the
Middle East with the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) Initiative and Latin America with Central
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) Initiative.
The SACU negotiations were designed to build on the success of the U.S. preference program for
Africa. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (USTR), BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE U.S.-SACU FTA
(2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/SouthemAfricaFTA/Background_
Information on theUS-SACU_FTA.html?ht=- (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). The United States suspended
active negotiations in 2006 but has declared that the FTA remains a "long term objective." US/TPR, supra
note 4, at 15.
The MEFTA Initiative was launched in 2003 and has produced three free trade agreements with
Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman. U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, 44
I.L.M. 544, available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/MoroccoFTA/FinalText/
SectionIndex.html (last visited Feb. 18,2009) [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA]; United States-Bahrain Free
Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., Sept. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M 544, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_
Agreements/Bilateral/BahrainFTA/finaltexts/Section_lndex.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter
U.S.-Bahrain FTA]; United States Trade Representative, US.-OmanFree TradeAgreement, U.S.-Oman, Jan.
18,2006, http://ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/OmanFTA/FinalText/Section_Index.htm (last visited
Feb. 18, 2009).
The CAFTA Initiative led to the Central American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade
Agreement. Central American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Dom. Rep.,
Aug. 5, 2004, 43 1. L.M. 514, available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Regional/CAFrA/
CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter CAFTA/DR].
15. The regional initiatives have produced FTAs with Singapore (EAI), Morocco, Bahrain, and
Oman (MEFTA), NAFTA and CAFTA. The other free trade agreements are bilaterals with Israel; U.S.-Israel
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-lsr., Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 653, available at
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Before the G. W. Bush Administration (Bush Administration), the United
States entered into only four free trade agreements, the U.S.-Israel FTA
(enacted in 1985), the U.S.-Canada FTA (enacted in 1988), NAFTA (enacted
in 1994) and the U.S.-Jordan FTA (enacted in 2001). 6 The preceding Clinton
Administration focused on completing the side agreements on labor and
environment cooperation and pursued passage and implementation of
NAFTA. 17 Most of its focus on regionalism, however, was on the Free Trade
of the Americas initiative. While informal bilateral talks were held with several
countries"8 that approached the United States about free trade agreements, only
one agreement was completed, the U.S.-Jordan FTA.' 9 Armed in 2002 with the
trade negotiating authority" long denied to the preceding administration, the
Bush Administration broadened its approach to regionalism. In every year from
2003 to 2007, the United States completed, and Congress approved, at least one
free trade agreement. Those eight free trade agreements are: the U.S.-Singapore
(2003), U.S.-Chile (2003); U.S.-Australia (2004), U.S.-Morocco (2004); U.S.-
CAFTA/DR (2005), U.S.-Bahrain (2006), U.S.-Oman (2006) and U.S.-Peru
http://tcc.export.gov/TradeAgreements/AllTradeAgreements/exp_005439.asp (last visited Feb. 18,2009)
[hereinafter U.S.-Israel FTA]; U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281,
available at http://wehner.tamu.edu/mgmt.www/NAFTA/fta/complete.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2009)
[hereinafter U.S.-Canada FTA]; U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6,2003,42 l.L.M. 1026,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/BilateraU/Chile-FTA/Final-Texts/Section-ndex.htm
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009); U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M.
1248, availableat http://ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/BilateraU/Australia-FTA/Final-Text/Section-index.htffl
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter U.S.-Australia FTA]; United States Trade Representative, US.-Peru
Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, April 12,2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/
Bilateral/Peru_TPA/FinalTexts/Section_Index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter U.S.-Peru FTA].
16. U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 15; U.S.-Canada FTA, supra note 15; NAFTA, supra note 2;
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset upload file250_5112.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA].
17. Then candidate Bill Clinton campaigned in 1992 against the NAFTA negotiated by the G.H.W.
Bush Administration and promised to negotiate labor and environmental side agreements to deal with gaps
in the agreement. After winning the election, President Clinton completed that pledge in 1993. See
NAFTA/Battle, supra note 10, at 2 (1994) (reviewing the importance of the labor and environmental issues
before, during and after the NAFTA negotiations).
18. The Clinton Administration began FTA talks with Jordan, Chile, Singapore and Australia-all
countries which approached the United States after NAFTA was completed. Esserman, supra note 9, at 14
(noting that the Clinton Administration did begin informal negotiations near the end of its term because of
1) the concern about the movement towards free trade agreements around the world, and 2) the paralysis at
the WTO).
19. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 16. The U.S.-Jordan FTA is the only FTA that does not follow
the pattern of the model FTA. It is only twenty pages long and does not cover all of the subject matters areas
negotiated in the others.
20. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§3801-13 (2002).
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(2007).21 Before the end of the Bush Administration, three other free trade
agreements were completed and signed with Korea (KORUS 2007),22 Colombia
(2007),23 and Panama (2007).24 None of these agreements have been approved
by Congress 25 or implemented. Before the end of the Bush administration, trade
promotion authority expired and the latest FTAs were held up by the shift in
political winds that comes with an election cycle.26  During his election
campaign, President-elect Obama expressed deep reservations about the U.S.
approach to regionalism27 and indicated there would be a reconsideration of the
issue under his leadership.28
Viewing the list of completed FTAs reveals a clear pattern to the surge in
U.S. regionalism. All of the recent FTAs, with the exception of the
CAFTA/DR, were bilateral agreements. Almost all of the bilateral FTAs have
been with developing or least-developed countries with asymmetric trading
relationships with the United States.29 Many of the FTAs have been with
countries with which the United States has a foreign policy concern or agenda."3
21. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP. (USTR), THE PRESIDENT'S 2008 TRADE POLICY AGENDA 107-15
(2008), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/ReportsPublications/2008/2008_Trade-
PolicyAgenda/assetuploadfile649_14563.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
22. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP. (USTR), U.S.-KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, U.S.-KOREA
(2007), http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Republic ofKoreaFTA/
FinalText/SectionIndex.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter KORUS].
23. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP. (USTR), U.S.-COLOMBIA TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT, U.S.-
COLOM. (Nov. 21, 2006), http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Colombia FTA/FinalText/
Section-Index.htmi (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter U.S.-Colombia FTA].
24. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP. (USTR), U.S.-PANAMA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, U.S.-PAN. (Jun.
28,2007), http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/PanamaFTA/Section_Index.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter U.S.-Panama FTA].
25. The Bush Administration made passage of the last three FTAs its chief priority. THE
PRESIDENT'S 2008 TRADE POLICY AGENDA, supra note 21, at 2. Despite this emphasis, and its submission
of the U.S.-Colombia FTA to Congress, none of the agreements was reviewed by Congress during the 2008
election year.
26. See generally Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA's Bad Rap, INT'L ECON.
(Summer 2008), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer-schott08O8.pdf(last visited
Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter NAFTA 's Bad Rap].
27. Id.
28. Mark Drajem, Obama May Delay NAFTA Overhaul in Victory for Caterpillar, GE,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 18, 2008 [hereinafter Obama NAFTA], http://www.bloomberg.coni/apps/news?
pid=20601103&sid=aQeuS 1RQRE3c&refer=us (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
29. Canada and Australia were the only two developed countries with which the United States
negotiated FTAs. The agreement with Australia is now the only bilateral FTA with a developed country.
30. The United States considers support of its foreign policy goals as one of the factors pointing
FTA partner status. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-233, INTENSFYING TRADE NEGOTIATING
AGENDA CALLS FOR BETTER ALLOCATION OF STAFF AND RESOURCES 8 (2004), available at
http:/www.gao.gov/new.items/d04233.pdf. (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) [hereinafter GAO 2004 REPORT]. For
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None of the completed FTAs have been with major trading partners. The one
exception is the pending KORUS."
Why over the last half-decade has the United States pursued so many
FTAs for such limited gains in trade and investment rights? What has driven
the developing country partners to pursue this avenue towards globalization?
The answers to these questions are quite different. As the world's largest
economy, the United States began to make FTAs the focus of its trade policy
for two major reasons. First, despite its power and credibility, the United States
has been unable to achieve its goals through multilateralism or wide-scale
regionalism. At the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Doha Round has
struggled, been suspended,32 and limped along over impasses between
developed countries33 and between the developed and developing countries."
example, the countries selected for bilateral FTAs under MEFAI were supporters of U.S. goals in the Middle
East and the "CAFTA nations supported U.S. objectives in IRAQ." Id See also Craig Van Grasstek, U.S.
Trade Policy andDeveloping Countries: Free Trade Agreements, Trade Preferences and the Doha Round,
ICTSD INFORMATION NOTE 4 (Int'l Center for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Geneva), Feb. 2008, available
at http://www.latn.org.ar/archivos/documentacion/PAPERDOCop-7l.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
According to Van Grasstek, the foreign policy goals were supporting the U.S. policy in the Middle East,
cooperating in anti-narcotic activity and agreeing to leave the developing country coalition at the WTO (the
Group of 21). Other particular foreign policy goals are met by the choice of Panama (security of the canal
zone) and South Korea (to offset problems arising from U.S.-N. Korea relations) and anti-drug efforts
(Colombia).
31. All of the existing and pending free trade agreements account for only sixteen percent of total
U.S. trade and sixteen percent of total investment. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-08-59, AN
ANALYSIS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR CONSULTATION UNDER
TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 20 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0859.pdf (last visited Feb. 28,
2009) [hereinafter GAO 2007 REPORT]. By contrast, S. Korea is the seventh largest trading partner of the
United States. The pending FTA would cover more trade than any other FTA, except for NAFTA. Jeffrey
J. Schott, The Korea-U S. Free Trade Agreement: A SummaryAssessment, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON.,
PB 07-7, Aug. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb07-7.pdf (last
visited Feb. 26, 2009).
32. Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Doha Round Negotiations: Suspended Indefinitely, 10(22) ASIL
INSIGHTS (2006), available at http://www.asil.org/insights06O9O5.cfn (last visited Feb. 26,2009) (describing
what led to the suspension and post-suspension prospects).
33. The Doha Round negotiations have continued despite the suspension. In December 2008, the
negotiating groups issued revised texts of agreements on agriculture and non-agricultural market access
(NAMA) which still have gaps. The WTO member states still have to reach consensus on major issues before
these agreements can be finalized. Statement by Pascal Lamy to the General Council, P/TO to Move Quickly
on WiderFrontin 2009, WORLDTRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO), Dec. 18,2008, http://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/news08_e/tncdg stat-1 7dec08_e.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
The ongoing impasse between the developed countries has been over the pace of liberalization in
agricultural trade. See U.S GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-07-379, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
CONGRESS FACES KEY DECISIONS AS EFFORTS TO REACH DOHA AGREEMENT INTENSIFY (2007), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07379.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
34. The most recent impasse between the developed and developing countries has come from the
insistence of the United States that the larger developing countries should make deep cuts or eliminate tariffs
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In its one protracted major regional effort, the FTAA, the United States was
unable to obtain a comprehensive agreement that met its goal of going beyond
WTO standards35 with all of the countries in the Western Hemisphere. These
failures inspired the creation of the "competitive liberalization"36 approach to
regionalism. The Bush Administration announced that it would move forward
simultaneously on the multilateral, regional and bilateral level with the belief
that success in one area (FTAs) would spur serious efforts to move forward at
the multilateral level. The U.S. declared that it would negotiate with like-
minded FTA partners ("can do" countries).37
Second, while the United States desires both increased trade opportunities
in and increased investment rights from FTA partner countries, it wants its
model FTA more.3" The model FTA embodies the United States' views on the
proper subjects and disciplines for trade negotiations. It would be preferable
to achieve a multilateral consensus on all of the subject areas covered in the
model. However, even if the WTO fails to completely adopt all of the topics,
the free trade agreements embody what can and should be accomplished. In
on major sectors of non-agricultural goods (such as chemicals and automobiles). The developing countries
apparently see such a demand as "an unacceptable raising of the bar at a very late stage in the negotiations."
With No Doha Conclusion in Sight, WTO Considers How to Proceed, 12 (No. 43), BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE
DIGEST (2008), available at http://ictsd.net/i/newsbridgesweekly/36562/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
35. See Gantz, Free Trade Area, supra note 4; see also GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 31, at 18
(United States Trade Representative (USTR) reported to the GAO that it had suspended the FTAA talks
because all of the countries in the region were unwilling to accept the U.S. model FTA).
36. "Competitive liberalization" is the phrase created by former USTR Robert Zoellick to describe
how the United States should proceed. "By pursuing multiple free trade initiatives, the United States has
created a 'competition for liberalization,' launching new global trade negotiations, providing leverage to spur
new negotiations and solve problems, and establishing models of success in areas such as intellectual
property, e-commerce, environment and labor, and anti-corruption." ROBERT B. ZOELLICK, OFFICE OF U.S.
TRADE REP. (USTR), THE PRESIDENT'S TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR 2005 (Feb. 18, 2005),
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Reports-Publications/2005/2005-Trade-Policy-Agenda/a
ssetuploadfile820_7314.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
37. Following the failure of the Cancun Ministerial meeting of the Doha Round negotiations in
2003, largely due to issues raised by developing countries, USTR Zoellick stated "we will not passively accept
a veto over America's drive to open markets. We want to encourage reformers who favor free trade. If others
do not want to move forward, the United States will move ahead with those who do." TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 56.
38. In the recent past, the United States committed itself to the idea that it should pursue only
"highly comprehensive 'gold standard' bilateral and regional FTAs." GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 31, at
18. This requires that agreements meet a number of "absolute requirements"---the inclusion of agriculture,
negative list approach to services, and intellectual property rights. Id. USTR noted that it had been unable
to pursue FrAs with major developed countries, the EU, Switzerland, and Japan, because of their
unwillingness to accept the comprehensive FTA model. Id.
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addition, the United States can meet its particular foreign policy goals and
eliminate more preference programs39 by adopting FTAs with certain countries.
For the developing country partners, the reasons for negotiating FTAs, and
binding themselves to the United States, reflect their relative size and power.
All of these countries are trying to avoid missing out on the worldwide
regionalism effort" and plotting some strategy for coping with globalization.
In practical terms, they seek secure market access to the world's largest market
and to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI)."1 The governments seeking
out and conducting these negotiations are also trying to "lock in'' 2 domestic
39. One of the motivations for the United States to pursue a regional or bilateral FTA is to convert
"one-way U.S. trade preference programs into two-way reciprocal agreements." Id. at 16. For example, the
Andean FTA Initiative (which produced bilateral FTAs with Peru and Colombia) "was motivated by a desire
to replace the Andean Trade Preference Agreements, while CAFTA-DR was motivated in part by a desire to
replace a major portion of the Caribbean Basin Initiative." Id.
All of the CAFTA/DR countries, as well as Peru, have already given up preference status by enacting
FTAs with the United States. Panama and Colombia will have to do the same if those bilateral FTAs are
approved by Congress.
40. The pace of regionalism, particularly bilateral free trade agreements, during the third wave
picked up as the Doha Round began to hit impasses. See Robert V. Fiorentino, Luis Verdeja & Christele
Toquebouef, Discussion Paper No. 12, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements: 2006
Update 1-2, WTO SECRETARIAT (Geneva Switzerland) (2006), available at http://www.wto.org/englishl
res_e/bookspe/discussionjpapersl 2a e.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
The countries seeking out RTAs seem to do so in response to other countries having done so, and the
trend "seems to have become irreversible almost as if FTA proliferation has reached a critical mass from
which there is no turning back." Id. at 13.
41. The experience of Mexico under NAFTA provides support for the notions that a U.S. FTA will
increase exports and investment. Without NAFTA, Mexico's global exports would have been twenty-five
percent lower and investment levels would have been forty percent lower. THE WORLD BANK, LESSONS FROM
NAFTA FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES (Dec. 17, 2003), http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAICOUNTRIES/LACEXT/0,,contentMDK:20393778-pagePK: 146736-piPK: 14683
0-theSitePK:258554,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
42. Kim Hyun-Chong, Minister for Trade, Republic of Korea, Remarks at the High Level Panel on
"WTO's Institutional Challenges" at the WTO Public Symposium, Regionalism, Development and Political
Direction: Major Challenges for the WTO in the 21 st Century 2 (April 20, 2005), available at http://www.
wto.org/english/newse/eventse/symp05_e/kim-e.doc (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) (According to Minister
Kim, the socio-political reason for a country to pursue an FTA is "to push ahead on domestic reforms and to
break with the past. Korea needs domestic reforms to continue its economic growth. Reforms must be
supported by liberalization measures or they can be undone overnight-what good are reform measures if they
could be undone overnight? Therefore, liberalization through FTAs is necessary to support the reform
process."). Id. at 2.
This same desire to "lock in" reform was one of the motivating forces for Mexico entering NAFTA
and for the countries in CAFTA/DR. THE WORLD BANK, CENT. AM. DEP'T AND OFFICE OF CHIEF ECON.
LATIN AM. AND CARIBBEAN REGION, DR-CAFTA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CENTRAL AMERICA
32 (2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/LACEXT/Resources/258553-1 119648763980/DR_
CAFTAChallengesOpportFinal en.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter DR-CAFTA: Challenges]
("For Central American nations, locking many of the reforms of recent years with an FTA that is costly to
violate should generate a credibility effect that could boost investment levels."). Id. at 32.
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reform efforts. In addition, the negotiation of a U.S. FTA can help complete
other integration efforts.43 There are two main aspects to this model-driven
approach to regionalism-the creation and refinement of the model and the
adoption of a system for selecting FTA"4 partners.
A. The Creation of the U.S. Model FTA
The U.S. model FTA, widely acknowledged by both the U.S. government45
and observers,46 has been in development for the last fifteen years. There are
two versions of the model: the NAFTA model and the later evolution, the
WTO-plus model. The United States pursues only free trade agreements
because of the freedom they allow. Free trade agreements have only limited
GATT discipline and virtually no real oversigh 7 by the WTO. Thus, once a
43. One of the gains the Central American countries hoped for was to revitalize and complete the
Central American Common Market. Id. at 16-18.
44. See discussion infra Part H (discussing of how the United States has selected its FTA partners
during the Bush Administration).
45. In its review of how the Bush Administration has conducted free trade negotiations under Trade
Promotion Authority, the GAO interviewed the officials at USTR and the other agencies (Agriculture,
Commerce, Labor, State and Treasury) which join in an interagency process with USTR to advise the
President on potential FTA partners. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 31, at 1-2. These officials discussed
the comprehensive model FTA. Id. at 17-18. See also ROBERT B. ZOELLICK, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP.
(USTR), THE PRESIDENT'S 2003 TRADE POLICY AGENDA 10 (2003), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_
Library/ReportsPublications/2003/2003-Trade-Policy-Agenda/asset-upload-file666-6142.pdf(last visited
Feb. 26, 2009) (noting that the regional and bilateral FTAs pursued by the United States promote the broader
trade agenda by "serving as models, breaking new negotiating ground, and setting high standards"); US/TPR,
supra note 4, at 14.
46. Frederick M. Abbott, A New Dominant Trade Species Emerges: Is Bilateralism a Threat?, 10
J. INT'L ECON. L. 571, 578 (2007) (stating that "[w]hen the United States or European Union tenders a draft
PTA [preferential trade agreement] to a developing country, it expects the basic template of its proposal to
be followed, and in some areas (such as investment of IPRE protection), the possibilities for effective
counterproposal are almost non-existent"); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTr, NAFTA
REvIsrrED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 56-57 (2005) [hereinafter HUFBAUER & SCHOTr] (noting that
the NAFTA provisions have served as precedents for the later FTAs and that successive agreements "have
drawn heavily on their predecessors, with NAFTA sewing as the primary template").
47. With regard to the rules-WTO Member States desiring to enter into free trade agreements only
have to satisfy the requirements of GAlT Article XXIV if they cover trade in goods and Article V if the
General Agreement on Trade in Services if they cover services. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
art. XXIV (5), (8)(b), Oct. 30,1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=l&id=208&chapter=0&lang--en#Participants (last visited
Mar. 21, 2009) [hereinafter GAI]; General Agreement on Trade in Services in General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
ofTradeNegotiations, Apr. 15,1994,33 I.L.M. 1125,1168, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/
legale/26-gats.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter GATS].
It is generally agreed that the actual requirements of GATT Art. XXIV and GATS V are relatively loose
and have not been fully defined. WORLD TRADE REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 308-12 (for a review by the
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free trade satisfies the basic GATT rules, it can contain whatever the partners
negotiate. One aspect of the model, however, is clear. The asymmetry in
negotiating power between the United States and its developing country
partners means that the latter have extremely limited leverage with regard to the
content of the agreement, the text or the level of commitments.
The NAFTA model established the basic design and coverage of the model
FTA. The NAFTA model also crated the basic layout of such agreements.
There is an opening section, Part One, that sets out the objectives (Chapter One)
and General Definitions (Chapter Two).48 There are other sections covering
Trade in Goods, Standards, Trade in Services, Investment and Intellectual
Property; all in all, there are sixteen subject matter areas.49 The other sections
are devoted to Administrative and Institutional matters, including dispute
settlement, and to exceptions and final provisions.50 The agreement text itself
is heavily drafted with core obligations and exceptions modeled on or adopted
from5' GATT rules. The text tends to run for more than 300 pages.52 Each
WTO of the elements in each article that have not been fully defined and how they might be interpreted).
With regard to the limited oversight-the WTO requires Member States entering regional trade
agreements to notify the organization. The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) has
jurisdiction over these arrangements. In 2006, the WTO established a review process for these agreements
that requires the creation of a factual report about the operation of each agreement. To date, the CRTA has
made only limited progress in finalizing some reports. WORLD TRADE REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 306.
48. All U.S. FTAs begin with the same objective-to create consistently with GATT Article XXIV
(and for the later FTAs, GATS Art. V) a free trade area. Compare NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 101, with U.S.-
Peru FTA, supra note 15, art. 1.1.
49. In 2005, the International Trade Commission (ITC) reviewed the first three FTAs based on the
NAFTA model. According to its comparison, the model FTA consists of twenty to twenty-five chapters, all
organized in the same order in all of the agreements with annexes (to address non-conforming measures with
regards to services) sometimes contains separate chapters on specific industry sectors or regulatory issues.
U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION (ITC), PUB. 3780, THE IMPAcTOFTRADE AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTED UNDER
TRADE PROMOTION AuTHORrrY 2-2, Table 2.1 (2005), available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/
pubs/332/pub3780.pdf(last visited Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter ITC IMPACT REPORT] (comparingthe structure
and contents of the Singapore, Chile and Morocco FTAs).
50. In NAFTA, these are Parts 7 and 8. Part 7 covers both general dispute settlement systems
(chapters 19 and 20). Part 8 covers the Exceptions to the FTA (chapter 21) and the Trial Provisions (chapter
22). NAFTA, supra note 2, at Pts. 7, 8.
51. The NAFTA text either adopts core GATT obligations or models the NAFTA obligation on the
GATT rule. An illustration of the first method comes in Art. 301(1) of NAFTA where each Party agrees to
"accord national treatment to the goods of another Party in accordance with Article III of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), including its interpretative notes...." NAFTA, supra note 2, art.
301(1). This provision concludes with the Parties agreeing to incorporate Art. III (and its interpretive notes)
or any equivalent provision of a successor agreement into NAFTA. Id. Another example is in the General
Exceptions provision of NAFTA where the Parties agree, subject to some limitations, to incorporate Art XX
of the GAIT. Id. art. 2101(l)(b). The NAFTA provision does not repeat all of the exceptions listed in GAIT
Article XX but it does clarify the meaning of two of the exceptions. "The Parties understand that the
measures referred to in GAIT Article XX(b) include environmental measures necessary to protect human,
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chapter has the same structure internally-with definitions for each topic
appearing at the beginning or end, general obligations in the middle sections,
and detailed annexes that contain either exceptions reservations or implementa-
tion aspects at the end. NAFTA covers labor cooperation and environmental
cooperation with two side agreements. The subject-matter chapters cover
National Treatment and Market Access for Goods,53 Sector-Specific Rules of
Origin,54 General Rules of Origin,55 Customs Procedures,56 Energy,57 Agricul-
ture, 58 Standards,59 Trade Measures, 60 Government Procurement, 6' Investment, 62
Services,63 Competition Policy,'$ Temporary Entry65 and Intellectual Property.66
All of the later FTAs follow the same design and even have the same basic
ordering of subject areas. Instead of side agreements on labor and
animal or plant life or health, and that GATT Article XX(g) applies to measures relating to the conservation
of living and non-living exhaustible natural resources." Id. art. 2101(1).
By contrast in Art. 309(1) of NAFTA, the Parties chose language that was modeled on that of Art.
XI(1) of the GATT). Compare art. 309(l) "no Party may adopt or maintain any prohibition or restriction on
the importation of any good ... or on the exportation or sale for export of any good destined for the territory
of another Party," with art. XI(I) "[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotes, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting Party on the importation of any product... or on the exportation or sale for
export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party." NAFTA, supra note 2, art.
309(1); GATT, supra note 47, art. XI(1).
52. The NAFTA text is more than 300 pages. The same is true of the more recent FTAs. See U.S.-
Peru FTA, supra note 15 (FTA runs for 334 pages not including the annexes containing special rules or side
letters.).
53. NAFTA, supra note 2, at Ch. 3.
54. Id. at Ch. 3, Annexes 300-A (Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector), 300-B (Textile
and Apparel Goods).
55. Id. at Ch. 4.
56. Id. at Ch. 5.
57. Id. at Ch. 6.
58. NAFTA, supra note 2, at Ch. 7A.
59. Id. at Ch. 7B (Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary measures); id. at Ch. 9 (Technical Barriers to Trade).
60. Id. at Ch. 8.
61. Id. at Ch. 10.
62. Id. at Ch. 11.
63. NAFTA, supra note 2, at Ch. 12 (Cross Border Trade in Services); id. at Ch. 13
(Telecommunications); id. at Ch. 14 (Financial Services).
64. Id. at Ch. 15.
65. Id. at Ch. 16.
66. Id. at Ch. 17.
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environmental matters,67 there are side letters for many of the subject matter
chapters.6"
The design reflects the basic reality that a U.S. free trade agreement is one
that produces managed free trade. For example, with regard to Trade in Goods,
the NAFTA model provides for the traditional phase-out of tariffs.69 In the case
of NAFTA, this was fifteen years.7" Built into the phase-out, however, is the
practice of back loading all sensitive products so that the worst effects on job
and market loss will be postponed until the parties can adjust. Another major
feature of the model Trade in Goods chapter is the adoption of generally
restrictive rules7 ' of origin that allow the parties to shield both specific products
and industries from full competition.
By contrast, the goal in the Trade in Services section of the NAFTA model
was to liberalize as much trade as possible. In the Trade in Services section,
there are several chapters covering the general approach to services
liberalization as well as special chapters on services governments traditionally
67. In the more recent FTAs, the agreements on labor cooperation and environmental cooperation
have been moved into the main body of the agreement. See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 15, at Ch. 17-18.
68. Recent U.S. FTAs have large numbers of side letters. See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 15 (which
has side letters). These are negotiated in response to the Executive Branch/Congressional cooperation that
occurs in order to produce the implementing legislation for FTAs. See CAROLYN C. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV.,TRADE PROMOTION AuTHoRITrrY AND FAST-TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY FOR TRADE
AGREEMENTS: MAJOR VOTES 13 (2007), available at http'//www.italy.usenbassy.gov/pdf/other/RS21004.pdf
(noting that Congress insists on additions or clarifications to trade agreements by this process). All U.S. FTAs
have side letters but not all of them have the same legal weight. Some are "records of understanding, others
can amount to agreed upon interpretations that add to or make effective changes." ITC IMPACT REPORT,
supra note 49, at 2-6.
69. The recent U.S. FTAs with developing countries have tariff phase-outs that go on for fifteen,
seventeen, or twenty years. The longer timeframes are reserved for import sensitive products, particularly
agricultural goods. Industrial goods' tariffs are always phased out by year ten. In this area, the U.S. FTAs
match most other FTAs worldwide, where the common pattern is for ninety percent of most of the imports
to be duty-free by the tenth year of implementation. WORLD TRADE REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 309.
70. NAFrA, supra note 2, at Ch. 3, Annex 302.2. NAFTA phased out tariffs gradually with some
being eliminated immediately, while others were phased out at five, ten and fifteen year intervals.
71. The rules of origin in an FTA specify which goods are entitled to duty-free treatment. NAFTA
established the set of general rules of origin still used in the later FTAs. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 401
(originating goods). The NAFTA rules are regarded as complex to apply because they have a higher degree
of variation across product types. The rules are those designed to, and have the effect of, protecting certain
products and sectors. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 46, at 474-76 (The authors explain how the
rules could be reformed in order to avoid the protectionist aspects. As currently designed, however, it is clear
that the restrictive/product specific rules are more difficult for traders to apply and custom officials to
enforce). According to one study, this aspect has been found to offset the advantage of the duty-free status
granted under the tariff phase-out provisions ofNAFTA. See Bolormaa Tumurchudur, Oliver Cadot, Antoni
Estevadeordal, Jaime De Melo, Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann & Jose Anson, Rules of Origin in North-South
Preferential Trading Arrangements with an application to NAFTA, 13 REV. OF INT'L ECON. 501, 501-17
(612-29) (2005).
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operate or heavily regulate-telecommunications and financial services. The
NAFTA goal of maximum liberalization is achieved by using the negative list
method for scheduling commitments.72 Unless a NAFTA party expressly
removes a service sector from liberalization-by listing it as a reservation-it
is opened up with regard to the core obligations of non-discrimination and
market access.73 This method:
1) tends to produce greater liberalization (unless the negotiating
partners agree on extensive reservations);
2) locks in any prior liberalization (since it does not allow roll
back); and
3) guarantees that any new service will be automatically covered
by the agreement.74
Other major subject-matter chapters of the NAFTA model--Government
Procurement, Intellectual Property Rights, and Investment-have been retained
and often expanded in later FTAs. As is the case with Trade in Services, all of
these areas are ones of U.S. comparative advantage and/or areas where the
United States wanted to go beyond the existing GATT/WTO disciplines. In the
case of Government Procurement, the NAFTA model chapter requires
governments to open up all listed federal government entities to competition.75
The chapter also contains the only approved method for such competition
-tendering procedures.76 The only multilateral Agreement on Government
Procurement (AGP) is not a mandatory requirement of WTO membership.77 By
requiring such a chapter, the NAFTA model thus opens a closed-off market for
72. This is completely different from the approach used in the GATS Agreement-where a service
sector is not covered by the agreement unless it is listed in the schedule (the "positive list" approach).
NAFTA, supra note 2, at Ch.12; GATS, supra note 47, art. VIII.
73. NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 1202, 1203. The non-conforming measures or reservations taken
by each NAFTA party are attached as an Annex. Id. at Ch. 12, Annex I.
74. ITC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 49, at 2-14. Another aspect of the negative list approach is
that even though an FTA partner can take reservations by designating them as such in the agreement, if the
country later liberalizes a non-conforming measure, it becomes "bound" and must continue. Id.
75. NAFTA, supra note 2, at Ch. 10. The chapter provides national treatment to all NAFTA firms
which went to bids for government procurements. This addition to the model FTA is significant because of
the large amount of trade in goods and services done by governments. See TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 60 (noting that "government spending on goods and services can amount to
ten percent of GDP or more").
76. NAFTA, supra note 2, at Ch. 10B.
77. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1153. The
Agreement on Government Procurement (Annex 4(b)) has a membership of approximately forty countries
as opposed to the WTO membership of fifteen countries.
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goods and services. The chapter on Investment has three major features that
cover all U.S. concerns. "Investment" is broadly defined in the model chapter,78
there are extensive protections offered for investor rights,7 9 and there is neutral,
binding investor/state arbitration to back up these rights."0 The Intellectual
Property Rights chapter covers not only what Intellectual Property (IP) rights
the FTA parties must recognize,8' but also the enforcement obligations (in the
form of border measures, administrative measures, and judicial proceedings)
that must be undertaken.82 Introduced in the NAFTA model are subject matter
chapters that have either been used for many, if not all, later agreements-
Standards chapters (Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Standards (SPS) and Technical
Barriers to trade), 3 and Competition Policy."
The NAFTA model also established the list of issues that were and remain
off the table. Labor mobility is limited solely to temporary entry privileges. 85
There are no rules that would discipline the use of the unfair trade statutes,
78. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1139.
79. Id. arts. 1102-10. The investor rights and protections are the same in each U.S. FTA (National
Treatment, MFN Treatment, Minimum Standard of Treatment, Performance Rights, Senior Management of
Boards and Directors, Transfers, and Expropriation).
80. Id. atCh. IIB.
81. The IP rights covered under NAFTA were patent, copyright, trademark, trade secrets, industrial
designs, and the lay-out design of integrated chips. NAFTA, supra note 2, at Ch. 17, arts. 1705,1708, 1709,
1710, 1711, 1713. The recent FTAs have followed the same template of covering trademarks, geographical
indications, domain names on the interet, copyrights and patents, in that order. See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra
note 15, at Ch. 17; U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 15, at Ch. 16; U.S.-CAFTA/DR, supra note 14, at Ch. 15.
82. NAFTA, supra note 2, at Ch. 17 (arts. 1714-19).
83. All of the U.S. FTAs have chapters on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Standards and Technical
Barriers to Trade. The later FTAs do not adopt the NAFTA text for the SPS Chapter but instead require the
parties to adhere to the later-adopted WTO SPS Agreement. See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 15, at Ch. 6.
84. Competition law chapters have not been included in all recent FTAs. There are no chapters on
this subject in the Jordan, Morocco, CAFTA/DR, Bahrain, Oman and Panama FTAs. This is an area where
the United States does not insist on the NAFTA model being followed. For a full analysis of these chapters
in U.S. FTAs, see D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter Into Non-
Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231, 258,
279-82 (2008).
According to Sokol, "the United States position may best be described as one that does not oppose
competition policy chapters as long as the chapters remain non-binding and the [F]TA counter-party finds
the conclusion of such a chapter to be important." Id. at 258-59.
85. NAFTA, supra note 2, at Ch. 16, Annex 1603 (allowing temporary entry for business visitors,
traders and investors, intra-company transferees and professionals).
Although allowing free movement of labor, particularly unskilled labor, would be of great interest to U.S.
developing country FTA partners, it has never been considered. During the debate over fast track negotiating
authority and NAFTA itself, the issue of job loss was heavily debated and one of the reasons many in
Congress voted against NAFTA. NAFTA/Battle, supra note 17, at 43-47.
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antidumping, and countervailing duty laws.86 The NAFTA model also limits
what is done to liberalize one of the most restricted areas of trade-trade in
agriculture.87 None of these issues was considered possible given the Con-
gressional concerns that drove the debate about fast track negotiating authority
and NAFTA itself.88
Two other distinctive aspects of the NAFTA model are its limited
institutionalism and diffuse dispute settlement mechanisms. The two features
are interrelated. The United States was determined to avoid creating a supra-
national institution that would possess legislative or adjudicative authority. The
NAFTA model retains most of the powers under the agreement for the
governments.89 The trade ministers of each government comprise the Free
Trade Commission that oversees the implementation of the FTA. The actual
work of administering the rules falls to advisory-only working groups9"
established for each major subject matter area. The NAFTA Secretariat
86. In NAFTA, there is a chapter on safeguards. NAFTA, supra note 2, at Ch. 7. The later FTAs
have a similar chapter. None of the U.S. FTAs have relied on the content of or how to administer/apply the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws. NAFTA partners, Canada and Mexico, did not want antidumping
laws to be allowed in the free trade area. See Sokol, supra note 84, at 278.
Congress has always been resistant to any trade legislation that would undermine the existing
antidumping statute. Under the recently expired TPA, the President was required to report to Congress within
180 days before the acceptance of any agreement if it could impact existing antidumping laws. 19 U.S.C. §
3804(d)(3)(A). One view is that it is the absence in FTAs of any discipline over anti-dumping that allows key
U.S. industries to support trade agreements. See generally SAFEGUARDS & ANTIDUMPING IN LATIN
AMERICAN TRADE LIBERALIZATION: FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE (J. Michael Finger & Julio J. Nogu6s eds.,
Palgrave Macmillan & The World Bank 2005); see also Matthew Schaefer, Ensuring that Regional Trade
Agreements Complement the WTO System: U.S. Unilateralism A Supplement to WTO Initiatives?, 10 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 585, 590 (2007) (discussing why anti-dumping is not part of FTAs).
87. The United States has refused to negotiate over the major agricultural barriers facing its
developing country FTA partners (production subsidies and tariff peaks or escalations) even in the regional
FTAA negotiations. These issues have never been on the table in any of the recent FTAs. See TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 59 (noting that the developed countries do not offer increased
market access on agricultural goods because they would face hostile and well-organized industry lobbying
efforts against such a move); see also Schaeffer, supra note 86, at 588 (noting that the behavior on agriculture
in regional trade arrangements tends to mirror the WTO behavior and is a manifestation of the "same political
sensitivities that prevent significant liberalization in the WTO").
88. See NAFTA/Battle, supra note 17, at 15-32. For a detailed analysis of the debate about the ill
effects of NAFTA on American employment. See generally id. at 117-22.
89. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTIr, supra note 46, at 488 (noting the limited institutionalism of
NAFTA).
90. This is one thing that has changed in recent FTAs. The actual work of the agreements is done
in subcommittees and working groups established for various subject matter area commitments. See
CAFTA/DR, supra note 14, art. 19.1(3) (authorizing the Free Trade Commission to delegate to
subcommittees and working groups the power to modify the tariff phase-out schedule and to create common
guidelines on tariffs and government procurement matters); see also U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 15, at Ch.
20.1.
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charged with overseeing the dispute settlement mechanisms and the working
groups was split into national sectors in preference to creating one central
political organ. All of the later FTAs share this same limited-governance
structure.
With regard to dispute settlement, the NAFTA model created multiple
mechanisms instead of one powerful entity. There are three major dispute
settlement mechanisms 9' designed to cover the major substantive areas of
dispute (trade and investment) and to deal with the problem caused by not
having FTA rules on unfair trade measures. Under Chapter 20,92 the parties can
have claims heard on violations of the agreement by provisions or nullifications
of the benefits of the agreement. Under Chapter 1 lB, NAFTA investors/
investments are allowed to pursue binding investor/state arbitrations to recover
damages from alleged violations of covered investment rights.93 In Chapter 19,
NAFTA citizens who have been subjected to unfair trade measures are allowed
to invoke their governments to pursue bi-national review of any antidumping
or countervailing measure that is improper under the administering country's
law.94 The creation of separate tailored mechanisms was meant to deal with
91. There actually four systems for dispute settlement in the NAFTA text itself. The fourth one is
a specialized dispute settlement system for disputes in the financial services sector. NAFTA, supra note 2,
at Ch. 14. NAFTA borrowed this idea from the U.S.-Canada FTA. No disputes have been brought under this
mechanism.
In addition, there are dispute mechanisms in the side agreements on labor cooperation and
environmental cooperation. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept
14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499, 1509-13 (Arts. 27-41), available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/regs/naalc/
main.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009); North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1490-94 (Arts. 22-36), available at http://www.cec.org/pubs-info
resources/law_treatagree/naaec/index.cfnvarlan=english (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
92. NAFTA, supra note 2, at Ch. 20. In Chapter 20 proceedings, a NAFTA party can bring a claim
that another party has violated the agreement or nullified or impaired benefits it expected under the
agreement. Id. art. 2004. The ad hoc arbitral tribunal empanelled to hear the dispute issues a report which
can form the basis for a negotiated solution between the parties. Id. art. 2018(1). This means that the panel's
determination is not binding. However, under Article 2005, there is a choice of forum that allows NAFTA
parties to choose the WTO's dispute settlement system. Id. art. 2005.
93. Id at Ch. 1 B. In Chapter 1 B proceedings, an investor is allowed to seek an arbitral panel for
alleged violations of the investor rights provided in Chapter 1 IA of NAFTA. The NAFTA parties consent
in advance to these arbitrations. The arbitral award (for money damages) here is binding and enforceable in
a court.
94. Id. at Ch. 19. Under Chapter 19, a firm in one of the NAFTA countries facing an adverse anti-
dumping or countervailing duty determination by another NAFTA party can make its government invoke the
bi-national review. The arbitral panel reviews whether the administrative determination is consistent with
the law of the issuing country. The decision of the panel can either affirm the determination or reverse it and
remand it to the administering authority. This bi-national review serves as a replacement for judicial appeals
in cases involving NAFTA parties.
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each area of dispute95 but not to create overall interpretations of NAFTA law.
All of the later FTAs have a corresponding general dispute resolution chapter
and an investment arbitration mechanism, but none have the bi-national review
process for unfair trade measures.
The WTO-model retains all of the major elements of the NAFTA model.
The shift or evolution has come as the United States has tried to achieve three
goals:
1) to use its FTAs as "models for success" for the multilateral
system;96
2) to adopt the FTAs that would obtain political acceptance by
Congress; 97 and
3) to cover new measures of concern, particularly development
issues.
95. The purpose of the Chapter 19 process was to resolve a controversial issue between the United
States and Canada. At the time of the U.S.-Canada FTA, Canada pushed for a resolution to the alleged
problem of United States bias against Canadian companies and Canada in the administration of its anti-
dumping and countervailing duty laws. Rather than accept Canada's offer to harmonize unfair trade statutes,
the United States agreed to a bi-national review of final AD and CVD determinations. Canada then insisted
that the system be carried over into NAFTA. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 46, at 199-200.
96. SeeUS/TPR, supra note 4, at 14. This is the idea behind "competitive liberalization." The U.S.
was using the three-pronged approach of negotiating trade liberalization at the bilateral, regional and
multilateral level simultaneously in order to move forward more quickly. The goal, however, was to also
create a model for the WTO to emulate. If the WTO failed to adopt fully the U.S. agenda, the FTAs would
stand as illustrations of successful attempts and deep economic integration, particularly on issues such as
investment and intellectual property. See GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 30, at 17.
97. The President and Congress share authority over trade policy. Any trade agreement negotiated
by the President must be approved by Congress. Since the 1970s, this power sharing has been accomplished
through a process whereby Congress delegated its authority to negotiate trade agreements, which are then
returned for approval quickly and without amendment. This "fast track" authority was most recently renamed
the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). It is under the 2002 version of TPA that the Bush Administration
completed all of the recent FTA negotiations (with Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Chile, CAFTA/DR, Oman,
Bahrain, Peru, Panama, Colombia and S. Korea).
According to Esserman, the most important factor used by the United States to select which FTAs to
negotiate has been to get the approval of the House of Representatives---"the need to secure 218 votes is the
overriding determinant." Esserman, supra note 9, at 15.
Both the House and Senate are required to vote on trade agreements, but with its power over the budget, the
House vote comes first. This also makes trade agreements a matter of local politics, particularly given the
potential loss ofjobs due to import competition. This was a major factor in the votes regarding NAFTA and
CAFTA/DR. Id at 17.
Obtaining Congressional approval has not always been easy for the recent bilateral and regional FTAs
with developing countries. See David A. Gantz, Settlement of Disputes Under the Central-America-
Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 331, 341 (2007)
(noting that the Executive Branch used up negotiating resources and considerable capital for a free trade
agreement that would produce about as much annual trade as NAFTA does in three weeks).
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The "models for success" idea is that by expanding the discipline in
certain areas (such as investment and intellectual property rights) the United
States could establish what could be advanced98 or added to the WTO
negotiating agenda.99 Two of the chapters from the model NAFTA have been
substantively revised-the Investment chapter and the Intellectual Property
Rights chapter. It is worth examining this evolution of the model for what it
shows about U.S. concerns and goals. Investment was always considered
crucial in FTAs. The United States hoped to gain increased and secure invest-
ment flows in all of the NAFTA Parties I°° and to encourage tariff-jumping
investment by non-member country firms.' The first investment chapter
appeared in the U.S.-Canada FTA. °2 By the time of NAFTA, the scope of
covered investments was broadened and the crucial investor/state arbitration
mechanism was added.'0 3 Almost all of the later FTA investment chapters"°
follow the design set out in NAFTA. Chapter 1 B is actually a model based on
98. Intellectual property rights are covered by the WTO through the Trade Related Intellectual
Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS). Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 l.L.M. 1125-26 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
The U.S. led the push to get such an agreement during the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-1994)
through diplomacy at the then GATT and also aggressive use of Section 301 (bringing unilateral trade actions
against countries with inadequate intellectual property rights protection). For a full review of this process,
see C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organization
Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. LAw 209,220-37 (1997). Nevertheless, TRIPS sets
only minimum standards for intellectual property rights. The United States would prefer to see even greater
protections offered.
99. The United States has been the leading proponent of including investment in regional trade
agreements. Negotiations on investment rights/protection were part of the Doha Development Agenda in
2001. However, the topic was withdrawn from the WTO agenda in the 2004 General Council meeting after
string opposition at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Meeting. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007, supra
note 1, at 61.
100. The concern about making investment rights secure and enforceable was an issue of great
concern vis-i-vis Mexico. Prior to the negotiating process for NAFTA, Mexico was known for its strict
regulation of investment and its embrace of the Calvo Doctrine (foreign investors limited to the
rights/enforcement given nationals). See HUFBAUER & SCHOT, supra note 46, at 201-02.
101. NAFTA, and all of the U.S. FrAs, achieve this by granting the Chapter IIA rights to all
NAFTA investors/investments, which allows non-party firms to take advantage of them. See NAFTA, supra
note 2, art. 1101(1).
102. U.S.-Canada FTA, supra note 15, at Ch. 16. The investment chapter in this early FTA lacked
the investor/state arbitration.
103. HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 46, at 200-02.
104. In the case of the U.S.-Australia FTA, the United States agreed with Australia that the
investment chapter did not have to include the investor/state arbitration mechanism. There is also no
arbitration mechanism in the U.S.-Jordan FTA (which does not follow the NAFTA model). The United States
later closed the gap by entering into a BIT with Jordan. In the case of the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, the United
States had already entered into a BIT and, therefore, had no need to include the chapter.
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a model.' °5 In design.0 6 and substantive coverage,' °7 Chapter 1 B is based on
the U.S. model Bilateral Investment Treaty. The United States believed, given
its experience with BITs since 1980, that it understood what the core
investment provisions meant. Additionally, the United States was not con-
cerned about the investor rights provisions being invoked against it.'l 8
In both regards, the United States was mistaken. There has been heavy use
of the 11 B system to challenge government measures in all three states. In
almost every arbitration, claims were made alleging violations of the minimum
Standard of Treatment (Art. 1105) and/or Expropriation (Article 1110). With
regard to both provisions, several arbitral tribunals issued expansive readings. '09
This led the NAFTA governments to respond by seeking judicial review of the
final awards and to their adopting an interpretation of one of the provisions."0
The concern the three governments felt about the ability of the decisions to
limit government regulatory powers-particularly in areas such as
environmental protection-also led the United States to revise its model
investment chapter for later FTAsl" and to alter its model BIT. These revisions
actually limit the type and range of complaints that can be made against the
governments under the Investment chapters.
The Intellectual Property Rights chapter has also evolved from the NAFTA
model. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) responded to U.S.
industry demands most closely in regards to the substantive coverage of this
chapter. USTR has even worked in conjunction with industry and the
105. Chapter 11 ofNAFTA was modeled on the first model BIT. That model was created in 1980
and revised in 1984. See Joel C. Beauvais, Regulatory Expropriations under NAFTA: Emerging Principles
and Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 253 (2002); see also Charles H. Brower 11, Structure,
Legitimacy and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 44 (2003) [hereinafter
Brower].
106. Chapter 11 is divided-as is the model BIT-into two sections. The first section sets out the
investor/state arbitration mechanism.
107. The investor rights in Chapter 1 IA are the same ones offered in the model BIT. For the current
version of the model BIT, see Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (2004),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeSectors/Investment/Model_BIT/assetupload_
file847_6897.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
108. HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 46, at 200-01 (noting that U.S. negotiators were not worried
that Chapter 1I would be used against the United States).
109. For an analysis of how the results in these arbitrations altered the investment chapter in the
WTO-plus model, see generally Meg Kinnear & Robin Hansen, The Influence of Chapter 11 in the BIT
Landscape, 12 U.C. DAVIS INT'L L. & POL'Y 101, 106-12 (2005); David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA
Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 679, 725-27 (2004) [hereinafter Gantz, Evolution].
110. See Brower, supra note 105, at 47-48.
111. See Gantz, Evolution, supra note 109, at 725-60.
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Intellectual Property Advisory Group" 2 to produce a "model of text" that
greatly expands the rights of IP holders" 3 beyond the gains made in NAFTA
and the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) of the
WTO. This evolution moves from delineating the minimum standards and
basic enforcement procedures for intellectual property rights towards prescrib-
ing U.S. levels in both areas. Significant alterations include limiting what is
non-patentable,' "' limiting government regulatory power,' and expanding the
terms of the two major forms of IP rights-patent and copyright."6  The IP
Advisory Group report on each FTAjudges the negotiations as successful based
112. USTR uses an advisory group structure-based on topic or industry-for producing review
reports on whether negotiated FTAs satisfy U.S. negotiating goals. GAO 2007 Report, supra note 31, at
53-58 (for how the trade advisory committee is set up, overseen and operates). One of these advisory groups
reviews the intellectual property chapters of each FTA (ITAC 15).
113. REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY OF TRADE ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS (ITAC- 15), THE U.S.-PERU TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT (TPA): THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROVISIONS 3 (2006) [hereinafter PERU ITAC REPORT], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_
Agreements/BilateraVPeru_TPA/Reports/asset-upload file473_8978.pdf(last visited Feb. 28, 2009); see also
REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY TRADE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (ITAC 15)
REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY OF TRADE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (ITAC-
15), THE U.S.-PANAMA TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT (TPA): THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS
(2007) [hereinafter PANAMA ITAC REPORT], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/
BilaterallPanamaFTA/Reports/assetupload file960_11234.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
114. In recent FTAs, U.S. partners have agreed to patent plants-an area left as one a country could
consider non-patentable under TRIPS.
115. There has been a push by USTR to negotiate for a provision that would limit an FTA partner's
ability to require (under certain circumstances) compulsory licensing of patent rights. See generally Rahul
Rajkumar, The Central American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run Around the DOHA Declaration on
TRIPS andPublic Health, 15 ALB. L.J. Sa. & TECH. 433, 441-47, 473 (2005), for what TRIPS allows and
the most recent FTAs.
116. In recent FTAs, the United States has pushed for the extension of copyright term closer to
longest of U.S. levels. It has only achieved that commitment with Oman. In the Peru and Panama
agreements, the countries would only agree to what ITAC- 15 calls the compromise at seventy years. PERU
ITAC REPORT, supra note 113, at 12. This goes well beyond the TRIPS' minimum standard of fifty years.
TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 12.
With regard to patents, the protection offered would be extended if the issuance of the patent was
subject to "unreasonable delay." U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 15, art. 16.9(6)(b).
Since developing countries frequently take longer to issue patents than developed countries, this
provision will ensure a patent holder the full enjoyment of the patent term. In the U.S.-Peru ETA,
"unreasonable delay" was the later of five years from filing or three years after an examination request. PERU
ITAC REPORT, supra note 113, at 15. In earlier FTAs, USTR had negotiated even better terms-the later of
four years from filing or two years from examination. Id.
On patents, the FTAs also prohibit the marketing approval of generic drugs during the term of the drug
patent. This provision effectively extends the life of the patent since competing countries must wait until after
the patent has run to produce a competing product.
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on how closely the extensions come to U.S. levels of protection."7 The recent
FTAs also make extensive additions to the enforcement obligations" 8 and
remedies 9 that must be allowed for IP infringements. The evolved Intellectual
Property Rights chapter is designed to limit in every major way120 how an FTA
partner regulates intellectual property.
With regard to the second goal-working with Congress-it could only be
satisfied by making the labor rights and environmental cooperation issues more
prominent in the agreements. The Republicans and Democrats have tended to
differ on why they support, or refuse to support, free trade agreements.' 2' In
order to achieve the necessary House votes, it was believed that the Democratic
issues (of labor rights and environment protection) had to be given more
prominence and effectiveness in the agreements. 1
22
117. PERu ITAC REPORT, supra note 113, at 5. The industry advisory committee (ITAC 15) urges
USTR to obtain the U.S. level standard-as was done in several of the MEFTAI bilateral FTAs (Oman and
Bahrain)-in future FTAs.
118. Id. at 19 (regarding enforcement obligations). The United States pushes its FTA partners to
agree to greater enforcement obligations because despite its success at getting new rule-making in the IP area,
the United States continues "to suffer billions of dollars in losses due to global piracy, counterfeiting and
other infringements of rights provided in TRIPS (and in the various FrAs)-primarily due to ineffective
enforcement by these trading partners." Id. at 18.
119. See U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 15, art. 16.11 (11-17) (civil remedies), art. 16.11 (18-25)
(provisional remedies), art. 16.11 (26-28) (criminal remedies); PERU ITAC REPORT, supra note 113, at
19-20.
120. See Kenneth C. Shadlen, Globalization, Power and Integration: The Political Economy of
Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Americas, 44 J. DEV. STUDIES 1, 12 (2008) [hereinafter
Shadlen] (noting how the government limitations on the monopoly given by patents--"how easy or difficult
it is to obtain a patent, how long the exclusive rights last, and the extent to which the holder can exclude
others from freely using the idea"--are those developing countries use to get access to foreign innovations).
The WTO-Plus model IP chapter limits the regulatory power of each FTA partner in all of these areas.
121. See I. M. DestlerAmerican Trade Politics in 2007: BuildingBipartisan Compromise2 PB 07-5
(2007), available at http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb07-5.pdf(last visited Feb. 26, 2009)
(noting that the Congressional approval process for CAFTA/DR revealed the split between the Republicans
and Democrats--CAFTA/DR "energized the concerns of Democratic members and constituencies over deals
with countries with poor perceived labor and environmental records."). Id. at 2.
122. The agreements on labor and environment were moved into the text of the U.S. model FTA.
Id. at 6. These early Bush era FTAs, however, kept the NAFTA formula for such agreements-that the parties
pledge to enforce their own labor and environmental laws. By 2007, the Democrats had enough votes in
Congress to push for a long-held view that "U.S. trade agreements should include enforceable commitments
to uphold basic labor standards." Id. at 6. The negotiations between the House Democrats and USTR
ultimately produced a reworking of these agreements. In the labor chapters, the Parties agreed to "adopt,
maintain and enforce in their own laws and in practice the five basic internationally recognized labor
standards, as stated in the 1998 ILO Declaration." Those rights are:
1) freedom of association;
2) effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
3) the elimination of all forms offorced or compulsory labor;
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The third goal of adding new areas, such as a Transparency/Anti-
Corruption' 23 chapter and one on Trade Capacity Building, 24 was necessitated
4) effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on the worst forms; and
5) elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
Id. at 20, app. B (containing summaries of the Bi-Partisan Agreement of May 10, 2007); see U.S.-Peru FTA,
supra note 15, art. 17.2. In addition to having these provisions in the labor chapters, all of the more recent
FTAs (Peru, Panama, Colombia, and KORUS) subject allegations of violation of the labor and environmental
chapters to the same general dispute settlement system used for trade violations. See, e.g., U.S.-Peru FTA,
supra note 15, arts. 17.7(6) (Labor chapter), 18.12(6) (Environmental chapter).
123. The chapters on transparency and corruption provisions first appeared in the FTAs with
Morocco. See U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 14, at Ch. 18.1-4 (dealing with the traditional transparency
issues of publishing all rules, regulations and the due process rights allowed citizens concerning notification,
administrative proceedings and review and appeal of administrative or judicial proceedings), 18.5 (dealing
with the anti-corruption obligation to adopt measures to criminalize corrupt payments). The other two FTAs
negotiated and enacted at around the same time, with Chile and Australia, have the transparency obligations
but no provision on anti-corruption. All of the recent FTAs (CAFTA/DR, Peru and the pending FTAs with
Panama, Colombia, and KORUS) have a slightly expanded section on anti-corruption.
Transparency has always been a core principal of U.S. FTAs. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 102(1)
(transparency is listed as one of the principles of the agreement in Article 102-which sets out the objectives
of NAFTA).
By placing the transparency obligations in a separate chapter the WTO-plus model attempts to
underscore the connection between good governance and strong economics. Anti-corruption is now also
widely regarded as one of the biggest constraints facing developing countries as they pursue economic
growth. The World Bank with its mission of eradicating poverty, for example, has made anti-corruption one
of its key priorities-aiming its efforts at World Bank projects. At the same time, the topic has attracted a
great deal of attention on the issue of the link between corruption and development.
For a summary of the issues involved see Omar Azfar, Yong Lee & Anand Swamy, The Consequences
of Corruption, 573 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sa. 42, 50-53 (2001) [hereinafter AzFAR] (noting the
studies which have examined the link between corruption have found corruption has a negative impact on
both the rate of investment and GDP growth of countries and that better institutional quality is linked to
economic growth).
124. Trade Capacity Building was first added to U.S. FTAs in CAFTA/DR. See CAFTA/DR, supra
note 14, at Ch. 19 (entitled Administration of the Agreement and Trade Capacity Building). Similar
provisions are in the U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 15, at Ch. 20, U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 23, at Ch. 20,
and U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 24, at Ch. 19. Befitting its level of economic development, the KORUS
agreement lacks any trade capacity building provisions.
The United States coordinates trade capacity building assistance through the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). Trade capacity building was aimed at assisting countries with accession
to and implementation of WTO agreements and to "build the physical, human, and institutional capacity to
benefit more broadly from a rules-based trading system." GAO, U.S. TRADE CAPACrry BUILDING ExTENsIVE
BUT ITS EFFECTIVENESS HAS YET TO BE EVALUATED, GAO-05-150, at 3 (2005) [hereinafter GAO 2005
REPORT]. The connection to U.S. FTAs is the existence of a USAID/USTR interagency group formed to
assist countries involved in free trade negotiations. Such efforts were made with regard to CAFTA. Id. at
3, 4. Congress began to appropriate funds for trade capacity building programs in 2004. Id at 6, 7. The
largest proportion projects funded out of TCB were for trade facilitation-which includes, among other
things, customs operation and administration and regional trade agreement capacity (defined as "to increase
the ability of regional trade agreements and individual countries to facilitate trade and help potential regional
trade agreement members.") Id. at 9, Table 1.
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by the types of FTA partners chosen by the United States. As the Bush
Administration was refining the model FTA, it was seeking out FTA partners
that would adopt the model. For the FTAs negotiated after the granting of TPA,
the United States developed a list of factors'25 for determining which countries
should be FTA targets. The major factors became:
TCB Projects aimed at the Latin American FTA partners of the United States include: a project in Central
America to improve labor law compliance and a project in El Salvador to help Salvadoran food producers
meet SPS standards with regard to exports of fruits and vegetables. Id. at 13, 14. The USAID approach to
regional economic growth in Central America has been done by "taking stock of each government's
capabilities through diagnostic tools." Id. at 22.
125. The National Security Council (NSC) actually developed the list by shortening an earlier 13
factor list developed by USTR. The thirteen factors were:
1) Congressional guidance;
2) Business and agricultural interest;
3) Special product sensitivities;
4) Serious political will of the prospective partner to undertake needed trade reforms;
5) Willingness to implement other reforms;
6) Commitment to WTO and other trade agreements;
7) Contribution to regional integration;
8) Support for civil society groups;
9) Cooperation in security and foreign policy;
10) Need to counter FTAs that place U.S. commercial interests at a disadvantage;
11) Need to do other FTAs in each of the world's major regions;
12) Need to ensure a mix of developed and developing countries; and
13) Demand on USTR resources.
According to USTR, these factors did not have relative weights. GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 30,
at 7-8.
Factors 1-3 are on Congressional guidance, business and agricultural interest and special product
sensitivities. According to the GAO's interview with USTR, it consults with Congress before and after FTA
partner selection "to ensure support and eventual congressional approval." Id. Additionally, USTR officials
also examine public support, particularly from business and agricultural interests, and assess how the FTA
will affect certain sectors that have always been of interest, textiles and sugar. Id.
The Executive Branch rarely moves forward if there is political opposition. See Gantz, Free Trade
Area, supra note 4, at 187 ("Even the most free trade oriented administrations ... are not likely to brave
domestic political opposition unless there is enormous pressure from the business community to move
forward and some semblance of bipartisan support in Congress.").
Factors 4 through 6-the political will of potential FTA partners to implement trade reform and other
reforms-deal with whether the FTA partner is willing to undertake obligations inherent in a U.S.-led FTA.
In judging these factors, USTR examines the target country's "trade capabilities" and its "track record in
meeting current trade obligations." GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 30, at 7. Since USTR regards FTAs as
a "development tool," it is crucial that the FTA partner be willing to put in place other economic reforms.
In choosing an FTA partner, USTR tries to make sure that the country understands "(i) how important it is
to make this commitment to reform and (2) the extent of the obligations that a comprehensive FTA with the
United States involves." Id. at 7-8.
An example of the type of other reforms undertaken by FTA partners were those taken by Chile to
eliminate price controls and privatize state-owned enterprises. Id. at 42.
Factor 7-contribution to regional integration-is a recognition that bilateral FTAs can be an
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1) country readiness;
2) the economic and commercial benefit of the agreement;
3) the benefits to the broader trade liberalization strategy of the
United States;
4) compatibility with U.S. interests;
5) Congressional/Private sector support; and
6) U.S. government constraints. 1216
The first factor, country readiness, involves "the country's political will, trade
capabilities and rule of law systems.' 27 In the interagency review/selection
process used to select FTA partners, each agency examined the issues of which
they have competence.' 28 Most notably, the Office of the USTR looked at the
target partner's adherence to trade obligations and its leaders' "commitment to
negotiating all trade issues that currently comprise the comprehensive FTAs
that the United States seeks to negotiate."'129 While the United States examines
the economic benefits for the FTA, the willingness of the partner to adopt the
model FTA 3 ° as well as pro-market and rule of law'3 . reforms, its support for
important part of U.S. regional free trade initiatives. Id. at 8. For a discussion concerning Factor 9 regarding
foreign policy and national security, see GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 30.
Factor 10-countering FTAs that place U.S. commercial interests at a disadvantage-confronts one of the
realities of the worldwide proliferation of regional trade agreements. Once a competing trading nation begins
to enter into a trade agreement with a potential FTA partner, the United States would be at a disadvantage.
One of the major reasons why the United States entered into an FTA with Chile was because that country had
entered into FTAs with U.S. competitors-EC, Canada and Mexico-and, as a result, had cut its imports of
U.S. products by almost one-third. Id. at 42 (noting that the United States lost export market share in Chile
due to that country's other FTAs).
126. Id. at 9-10; GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 31, at 12-14.
127. GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 30, at 9. The United States relies on the definition for "rule of
law" developed by USAID-the agency responsible for coordinating U.S. aid to developing countries.
According to USAID, the rule of law "embodies the basic principles of equal treatment of all people before
the law and is founded on a predictable and transparent legal system with fair and effective judicial and law
enforcement institutions to protect citizens against the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts." Id.
n.10.
128. USTR selects FTA partners after reviewing these factors with an inter-agency group consisting
of the Departments of State, Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, the
International Trade Commission and Treasury.
Each agency concentrates on its area of expertise. While USTR focuses on the trade ramifications of the
FTA, the Treasury Department looks at the FTA partner's "overall macroeconomic stability and the strength
of its financial and banking system." Id. at 9.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 16-18.
131. One of the motivating factors for the U.S.-Morocco FTA was to support the political reform
movement in that country. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 3 1, at 13. In the case of CAFTA/DR, the United
States was trying to strengthen "free-market" reforms in the belief that the growth and development that
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U.S. trade policies (factor 3)132 and foreign policy positions (factor 4), and
whether the target has support from "Congress, business groups, and civil
society" (factor 5)133 matter more.
Almost all of the FTA partners chosen using this process (after 2003) were
developing/least developed countries willing to adopt the full FTA model,'34
support the U.S. trade positions (in the FTA or WTO), allow the United States
to convert trade preference program recipients into reciprocal trading partners,
and help the United States pursue its foreign policy goals. Given the develop-
ing country status of its FTA partners, the United States began to consider free
trade agreements as "development tools" and, therefore, decided to include
some chapters to deal with two of the largest impediments faced by developing
countries attempting trade liberalization-rules of law problems, particularly
corruption, and practical limits on the ability to trade.135
II. THE EFFECTS OF THE MODEL FTA ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE
CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY
A. The Reception of the Model FTA
The developing country FTA partners of the United States are seeking both
concrete gains and more intangible policy achievements. In the first category
falls the need all of them have for secure market access. Many of the U.S. FTA
partners have access through U.S. preference programs offering duty-free
treatment or products from recipient countries. But the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) and the regional trade preference programs (such as the
Andean Trade Preferences Act) all suffer from conditionality (which limits the
products allowed to benefit from the duty-free treatment) and designed
would come from an FTA would help "deepen democracy, the rule of law, and sustainable development."
Id. at 13. With regard to the bilaterals with the Andean countries, the United States was trying to strengthen
democracy and fundamental values (rule oflaw, sustainable development, transparency, anti-corruption, and
good governance). Id.
132. The United States does push forward with countries that support U.S. trade goals. Of great
importance here is whether the FTA partners have supported the United States in its regional free trade efforts
and at the WTO. GAO 2004 REPORT, supra note 30, at 10. Chile and the CAFTA countries were chosen
because of their support for the U.S. position in the FTAA (to get a comprehensive WTO-plus agreement)
negotiations. Id. at 42-43, 52.
133. The President does not move forward on FTAs with partners unlikely to garner support from
Congress-with which it shares political power-and business interest groups. Congress receives notification
at least ninety days before the President starts negotiations with an FTA partner. Id. at 13.
134. None of these agreements (with CAFTA/DR, Oman, Bahrain, Peru, Panama, Colombia, and
KORUS) have any departures from the WTO-plus model, supra note 14, at 15.
135. These are the recent FTA chapters on Transparency/Anti-Corruption and Trade Capacity
Building. Id.
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obsolescence (each program sunsets and must be renewed periodically). '36 All
of these countries also need capital and are seeking infusions of foreign direct
investment.'37 In the case of trade in services, the free trade agreement can
force a liberalization that results in first time or more complete competition. 138
In the area of policy goals, the developing countries are seeking to "lock
in" previous macroeconomic reforms that the negotiating government has
already achieved prior to the completion of the free trade agreement
negotiations. The "lock-in" is achieved by the institutionalization required to
implement the free trade agreement. Once these policies are put in place, it is
very difficult' 39 -if not impossible-for later governments to undo the reforms.
The other policy goal of the developing countries is to have more control over
the globalization process. In a world where regionalism is on the rise, a
demanding free trade agreement from a major trading partner seems preferable
to isolation or falling further behind as other countries gain preferential access.
Does the U.S. model FTA fulfill these needs and goals of its developing
country partners? The evidence is mixed. By entering a reciprocal FTA, the
136. The GSP is the largest U.S. preference program-it allows developing countries duty free access
to the U.S. market GSP for thousands of products from over 100 designated, beneficiary countries. OFFICE
OF U.S. TRADE REP. (USTR), A GUIDE TO THEU.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEMOF PREFERENCES (2006), available
at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Development/Preference Programs/GSP/Section -ndex.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2009). The current version, which has been enacted multiple times, expires at the end of 2008. The
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (2004), was first passed in 1983 and expanded in 2000
and 2002 in order to help countries in the area access the U.S. market. THE PRESIDENT'S 2008 TRADE POLICY
AGENDA, supra note 21, at 130. The Andean Trade Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105 Stat. 1233
(1991), was passed to aid the Andean countries in their efforts to develop spur regional economic
development to provide "economic alternatives to the illegal drug trade, promote domestic development, and
thereby solidify democratic institutions." Id at 129; see also Kevin L. Fandl, BilateralAgreements andFair
Trade Practices: A Policy Analysis of the Colombia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 10 YALE HUM. RTs. &
DEV. L.J. 64, 65 (2007) (noting the concern of Colombia over the Andean Trade Preferences Act).
137. All of these developing countries need capital. It is why so many of them have been willing to
sign Bilateral Investment Treaties. See Andreas Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law,
42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 126-28 (2003) (discussing the rationales for entering BITS); Jeswald W.
Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation ofBilateral Investment Treaties and
Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 77-111 (2005) (describing the BIT as offering a "promise of
protection of capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the future" and explaining that his study
reveals that this bargain has worked).
138. Some of the FTA partners have government held and thus closed off services sectors. For
example, Costa Rica had to open for the first time both its telecommunications and insurance sectors under
the terms of CAFTA/DR. See DR-CAFTA: Challenges, supra note 42, at 44. Most of the other Central
American countries had already liberalized most services sectors in the years prior to the agreement and hoped
that the FTA commitments "should boost the credibility of the reforms of recent years . I..." Id. at 42.
139. Every U.S. FTA provides the parties with the right to withdraw from the agreement within six
months after it provides notice to withdraw to the other parties. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 2205. Actual
withdrawal, however, would be quite costly once business and trading patters had shifted to accommodate
the new regime. No FTA partner has seriously considered withdrawal.
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developing country does gain secure market access. The experience of Mexico
illustrates that increased market access occurs and that the United States will
continue to purchase a greater percentage of its needs from FTA partners. 4 '
This does not mean that the FTA can guarantee effective market access for each
FTA partner. In order to gain this, the developing country has to have exports
of value and satisfy U.S. standards. 4 '
Using Mexico as the "model" developing country partner also reveals that
investments are significantly increased when a country joins a U.S. FTA. 142
Levels of investment, however, do not provide a complete picture. The creation
of a pro-investment regime is one factor in attracting FDI, but it is not the only
factor.'43 The developing country FTA partners of the United States all have
140. Using Mexico as a model-beforeNAFTA, Mexico faced a trade deficit with the United States.
Ten years after its entry into force, Mexico was running a trade surplus with the United States of $28.9
billion. See Ranko Shakri Oliver, In the Twelve Years ofNAFTA, the Treaty Gave to Me... What, Exactly?:
An Assessment of the Economic, Social andPolitical Development in Mexico Since 1994 and their Impact
on Mexican Immigration into the United States, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 53, 74 (2007) [hereinafter Oliver].
Mexico is also a more important trading partner of the United States-the second most important market for
U.S. agriculture exports. Press Release, Office U.S. Trade Rep. (USTR), U.S.-Mex., Officials Meet to
Discuss NAFTA (Jan. 11, 2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/
2008/January/USMexicanOfficialsMeet toDiscussNAFTA.html?ht = (last visited Feb. 26,2009); see
also TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 70 (noting the increase in intraregional trade
for Mexico as a result of NAFTA and the focus of those exports on the United States, so that Mexico is "the
developing country with the highest concentration of exports to a single destination and the one with the
largest increase in export opportunities from world import demand growth.").
141. Standards pose greater compliance costs for developing countries trying to enter a developed
country market since they are "mainly standard-takers not standard makers. The cost for compliance are
estimated to cause a 10% decrease in potential export earnings." UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), GLOBALIZATION FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE
PERSPECTIVE 6 (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditc2007 l-en.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,
2009) [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION FOR DEVELOPMENT].
The United States did make efforts during the CAFTA/DR negotiating process to begin working with
the Central American countries on how to satisfy U.S. standards for particular products of major export
interest to those countries. The negotiations also discussed support for technical assistance on standards
issues and commitments were made for a continuation of such assistance from the United States and sanitary
and agricultural agencies. DR-CAFTA: Challenges, supra note 42, at 35, n.7.
142. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 74 (noting that investment levels
almost quadrupled from the period before NAFTA (1990-1994), when they averaged $5 billion per year, to
2000-2004, when they were $19 billion per year). The United States has been the largest source of FDI to
Mexico--contributing sixty-four percent of Mexico's FDI in 2006. Id.
143. See Tamara Lothian & Katharina Pistor, Local Institutions, Foreign Investment andA lternative
Strategies for Development: Some Views from Practice, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 101, 109 (2003).
Investment laws are not usually the "driving force" in the initial decision to invest in a country. Id.
According to Lothian and Pistor, other factors "play a greater role, such as the importance of access to raw
materials, the size and scope of the foreign market, or the geographical position of the target country ....
Id.
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limitations-underdeveloped infrastructure,'" workforce problems (relatively
low levels of education and skills),45 weak macroeconomic policies,'46 and
government problems (security and corruption).'47 What this means is that the
countries may or may not get sufficient investment of the type that will allow
the country to make gains technologically.'48 The "lock in" goal also seems to
be met. Although it is possible to withdraw from a U.S. FTA, no partner has
yet done so. The recent U.S. FTA partners, particularly in Latin America, have
also chosen closer integration with a major trading partner rather than lose out
to Asian competition 49 or fall further behind Mexico. 50 There is also evidence
that recent FTA partners have studied the Mexican experience under NAFTA
and have negotiated better than their precursor, particularly with regard to
144. All of the Central American countries, for example, have to work on transportation issues (road
quality and diversity) and ports to benefit fully from CAFTA/DR. DR-CAFTA: Challenges, supra note 42,
at II.
145. Id. (noting that all of the countries need to work on secondary education and that
some-Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras-need to work on primary education).
146. The decision a country makes on macroeconomic policy can actually dwarf gains from other
efforts-like trade reform. It is difficult to assess exactly how NAFTA has impacted Mexico, in part, because
of the effects of Mexico's use of capital inflows before NAFTA and its approach to inflation (anchoring the
peso to the U.S. dollar). Going into NAFTA, Mexico had an overvalued currency and a significant current
account deficit. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 66.
147. DR-CAFTA: Challenges, supra note 42, at 11 (noting that several Central American countries
must do work on governance issues).
148. Mexico offers an illustration of this phenomenon. "Mexican producers have become part of
a regional industrial block." TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 72. Thus far,
however, Mexico has not been able to move significantly up the production chain into full scale production
of skill- and technology-intensive goods. Instead Mexican companies have been "involved many in the low-
skill, assembly stages of the production of such goods." Id. at 73.
See also Oliver, supra note 140, at 83 (noting that export manufacturing "tends to be based on a production
model in which component parts are imported to Mexico for processing or assembly and then re-exported."
Mexico would need to shift more to a model in which domestic firms constituted a larger part of the chain
of production to have spill over effects on other parts of the economy).
149. See generally Enrique Dussel Peters, What Does China's Integration to the Global Economy
Mean for Latin America?: The Mexican Experience 58-81, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEMISPHERIC
INTEGRATION: RESPONDING TO GLOBALIZATION IN THE AMERICAS (Diego Sanchez Ancochea & Kenneth C.
Shadler eds. Palgrave Macmillian 2008); see also HUFBAtJER & SCHOTr, supra note 46, at 19, 30 (discussing
the competition Mexico faces in trade and attracting FDI from E. Asia and China).
150. The United States is the major market for all of the recent Latin American FTA partners. See
generally Shadlen, supra note 120, at 3-8. These countries send a greater proportion of their goods to the
United States than to each other. Only 13.2% of Latin American exports are intra-regional. NATHALIE
AMININAN, K.C. FuNG & FRACIS NG, WORKD BANK, POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER No. 4546,
INTEGRATION OF MARKETS VS. INTEGRATION BY AGREEMENTS (2008), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/defaulVWDSContentServerlW3PIB/2008/03/04/000158349_20080304084
358/Rendered/PDF/wps4546.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
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agriculture liberalization. 5' But even this success is a limited one. The largest
agriculture issue for many of these countries-having to face subsidized
exports-is not and will not be resolved by any FTA. The only valuable
solution would be a multilateral breakthrough at the WTO.
The U.S. model FTA, then, offers possibilities rather than guarantees.
Nevertheless, given the asymmetry in bargaining power, the developing
countries must accept the model largely as dictated. In recent years, countries
that have resisted the U.S. approach have been isolated,'52 and the United States
has refused to negotiate agreements not based on the model. An offer is a "one
size fits all prescription"' at a time when economic analysis'54 suggests that
trade (and financial) openness are not enough to create economic growth and
development. What a developing county must do is adopt an individualized
domestic policy agenda, focusing on governance reform, that complements
whatever trade-related reforms it undertakes. The individualized aspect is
crucial, as it reflects the reality that what holds back one developing country-
its "binding constraint"'"-is not always what hampers another. It is in this
151. See Oliver, supra note 140, at 76-89 (noting the significant loss of agriculture jobs in Mexico
after it opened up to more efficient and subsidized U.S. exports). By contrast, the CAFTA countries
negotiated for exceptions for maize and other food staple products to avoid a similar dilemma. DR-CAFTA:
Challenges, supra note 42, at 34.
152. See Abbott, supra note 46, at 578 (noting that Brazil and Argentina rejected meaningful
participation in regionalism with the United States because they were "unwilling to accept the basic template"
of the U.S. model FTA and that the United States then proceeded to negotiate with the Central American and
Andean countries in an attempt to isolate Brazil and Argentina and to "cause them to rethink their own policy
preferences.").
153. This description of the U.S. model approach has even been adopted by Congressional and
private sector sources consulted about the U.S. process. See GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 31, at 20. In
its review of USTR's model based approach, the GAO also interviewed former Congressional staff and
private sector sources who noted that "one size does not fit all" and developing countries "need help to
develop before they trade with the United States." Id.
This is also the conclusion reached by studies done on the impact of NAFTA and on CAFTA/DR. See
LESSONS FROM NAFTA, supra note 41; DR-CAFrA: Challenges, supra note 42.
154. See generally Ricardo Hausman, Dani Rodrik & Andres Velasco, Growth Diagnostics, in
NARcI S SERRA & JOSEPH E STIGLrrz, THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2008); seealso Dani Rodrik, Abstract, The New Development Economics: We Shall
Experiment, But How Shall We Learn? 24-28, available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-drodrik/
The%20New/o2ODevelopment%/20Economics.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) (discussing the new
development economics approach as one based on developing country-specific growth strategic and
innovations in industrial policy); Yong Shik Lee, Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade
Liberalization: A Viable Answer for Economic Development, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 701 (2003); LUIS
ABUGATTAS MAJLUF, SWIMMING IN THE SPAGHETTI BOWL: CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
UNDER THE "NEW REGIONALISM" (2004), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtab28_en.pdf (last
visited Feb. 26, 2009).
155. The term "binding constraint" is used by Prof. Dani Rodrik. See Dani Rodrik, How to Save
Globalization from its Cheeleaders, 1(2) J. INT'L TRADE & POL'Y 1, 23 (2007), available at
Taylor
regard that the U.S. model FTA most poorly serves its target partners. What the
developing country partner needs is policy space,' 56 more options for pursuing
its own problems, and limitations. The U.S. model FTA forecloses that policy
space in some areas (investment, government procurement, and subsidies) 57
that have been used by other developing countries regarded as success stories.
There is no real freedom to experiment with industrial policy based on the
values and concerns of the developing country. The overall effect is to
constrain the use of industrial policy in the very areas that may actually limit
growth and development. Finally, the U.S. model FTA imposes substantial
implementation obligations and costs on developing country partners at the
same time that it cuts off policy space.'58
B. The Future Model: Adapting FTAs into Development Tools?
The recent U.S. model FTA approach to regionalism has reached an end.
There are two reasons for this development. First, the underlying political
realities in the United States have shifted. Second, there will now be
competitive pressure for other approaches to regionalism in the face of stalled
multilateralism. Each trend will be analyzed in turn.
Given the results of the 2008 election, there will be a shift by both the
Executive Branch and Congress regarding trade policy. President-elect Obama
campaigned on a pledge to renegotiate NAFTA'59 and against the pending
http://www.jitd.com.tr/dtmadmin/upload/EAD/Konj okturlzlemeDb/JITD/volume_2/DaniRodrik.pdf(last
visited Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Save Globalization] (Rodrik notes that "[clurrent thinking has moved
considerably away from a standardized Washington Consensus-style approach to a diagnostic strategy which
focuses on each country's own binding constraints." Differences in the nature of these constraints shape the
appropriate economic strategies." Id. See also ROBERTO ZAGHA, GOBIND T NANKANI & WORLD BANK,
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990S: LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF REFORM 147 (World Bank 2005) (2004),
available at http://wwwl .worldbank.org/prem/lessonsl990s/chaps/05-ChO5 kl.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,
2009) (noting that developing countries signing regional agreements "will not generate positive export and
growth responses unless the countries themselves also pursue other necessary economic, political and social
reforms"). Id. at 147.
156. See generally TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 57-65 (for a complete
analysis of all of the ways in which a developing country entering into a North-South FTA can lose policy
space).
157. See Save Globalization, supra note 154; Azfar, supra note 123, at 706-11; TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 1, at 65.
158. The developing countryFTA partners have to absorb the costs ofimplementing the agreement's
obligations. In addition, without also making institutional and regulatory reforms, they will not benefit fully
from the FTA. See DR-CAFTA: Challenges, supra note 42, at 174. The Central American countries suffer
from excessive regulation (making start up time for firrs slower) and relatively high levels of administrative
corruption that can impose costs on FTA opportunities. Id. at 174, 186-88.
159. See generally Memorandum from the Trade Policy Study Group on A New Trade Policy for
the United States to the President-Elect and the 111th Congress (Nov. 25, 2008, available at
2009]
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FTAs. Although this position has moderated since the election, 6 ' there will be
a focus on NAFTA issues prior to any attempt to deal with the other pending
FTAs. Obama has focused on the negative effects of FTAs for the United
States, particularly for U.S. workers. As a response to this focus, it is likely
that NAFTA will be studied 6' and that the labor and environmental side
agreements will be altered to make those rights actionable. These efforts will
not really fix the impact of NAFTA--or other U.S. FTAs-on U.S. workers.
162
What would be more effective is the development of an effective Trade
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program 163 that retrains and supports workers
displaced by the operation of U.S. trade agreements.
The new Congress, with more Democrats, will have a greater voice in the
direction of U.S. trade policy. In order to complete the Doha Round
of negotiations, and even to renegotiate NAFTA, President Obama will have to
seek Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). In modem trade policy history,"6 each
Presidential request for such authority has sparked an acrimonious debate about
the scope and contours of the authority the President should be given. The
Obama Administration will also be pushed towards adopting and funding a
more complete 165 and accessible 166 TAA program in return for this grant of
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/20081217presidentmemo.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,2009)) [hereinafter
Memorandum to the President-Elect]. The Trade Policy Study Group is a bi-partisan group of twenty two
former trade officials (including three former USTR heads) lawyers and economists. The listing of all of the
members can be found at the end of the memorandum. Id. at 14.
160. See NAFTA 's Bad Rap, supra note 26.
161. Obama's Trade Stance Coming Into Focus, 12 (37) BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE DIGEST, (Nov.
6, 2008), available at http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridgesweekly/32652/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) (noting that
Obama is less interested in fundamentally changing the agreement than in "strengthening/clarifying" the
language on labor and environment and making these issues core principles of the agreement). With regards
to the other FTAs, such as KORUS, Obama would be seeking fixes to the deal (increased market access for
autos, exports of manufactured goods, protections for U.S. workers losing jobs and resolution of the long
running dispute over beef). Id.
162. Obama NAFTA, supra note 28. According to Gary Hufbauer, renegotiating NAFTA would not
address the concerns raised about labor as it 'would have no impact' on unionized jobs or workers wages in
the United States. Id.
163. Memorandum to the President-Elect, supra note 159, at 8,9. See generally William J. Mateikis,
The Fair Track to Expanded Free Trade: Making TAA Benefits More accessible to American Workers, 30
Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Mateikis], for a general description of the existing TAA program, its
limits and how it could be fixed to offer more aid to displaced workers.
164. See NAFTA/Battle, supra note 17, at 9, for a description of the battle over fast track
authorization before NAFTA was negotiated and how that battle represented the long-term power struggle
between the President and Congress; see also Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainerd, Trade Promotion Authority
Formerly Known as Fast Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More than a Name Change,
35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.REv. 1, 10-31 (2003) (describing the fight over the granting of Trade Promotion
Authority in 2002).
165. Mateikis, supra note 163, at 25. The existing TAA program does not cover all U.S. workers
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trade promotion authority.'6 7 Democrats objected to key aspects of the WTO-
plus model-the lack of sufficient and actionable labor and environmental
rights 6 ' and overly extensive demands in the intellectual property chapter.'69
In 2007, they proceeded to use the power of their ultimate approval over all
negotiated FTAs to force the renegotiation of the Peru, Panama, Colombia, and
KORUS FTAs to meet their concerns. 7° Now that the new Congress will be
faced with a trade-skeptical President, it is likely to be equally aggressive about
indicating what changes it wants to see in the U.S. approach to regionalism.
This moment for rethinking U.S. trade policy offers the country the chance
to completely change course. Instead of focusing on bilateral model-driven
FTAs, the United States could put its efforts into reenergizing its commitment
to multilateralism. This commitment could actually focus on making the link
between trade and development, the original goal of the Doha Round, a real
one. There is general agreement that completion of the Doha Round'' would
produce the greatest liberalization and the greatest benefit to developing
countries. Another option would be to reengage with true regionalism. If the
United States dropped its demands for the complete WTO-plus model FTA, it
would be in a position to revive the FTAA process or pursue other regional
efforts.'72 The United States could also redirect its approach with bilateral
that might be impacted by job or income loss due to trade-it does not cover service workers. See id.
166. Id. at 25-37 (describing how not enough displaced workers benefit from the TAA program due
to the certification process conducted, and mismanaged, by the Department of Labor); I.M. DESTLER,
AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 326-28 (Inst. for Int'l Economics 4th ed. 2005) (1992) [hereinafter American
Trade Politics] (noting that, despite the expansion of funding in 2002, the participation rate has remained
low). Destler points out that the TAA has always had lukewarm support from the Department of Labor and
the unions, which see it as a "second best alternative to limits on import growth." Id. at 326.
167. American Trade Politics, supra note 166, at 295-98 (describing how the reformulation of the
TAA program was central to getting Trade Promotion Authority passed in 2002).
168. See generally Destler, supra note 121, for a discussion of the push by Democrats for the issues
on labor rights and the environment that would have to be altered in the most recent FTAs with Peru, Panama,
Colombia, and KORUS; see also id. at 20-23, app. B (containing an extended summary of the Bi-Partisan
Agreement of May 10, 2007).
169. Id. at 25-26, app. B (noting that the Bi-Partisan Agreement of May 10, 2007 limits the aspects
of the FTAs that link drug testing (and the data produced for it) and patent issues).
170. See generally Abbott, supra note 46.
171. See generally Sungjoon Cho, Doha's Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165 (2007);
Memorandum to the President-Elect, supra note 159, at 10 (noting that the United States and other WTO
Members would stand to gain three things from completing the Doha Round:
I) gaining the tariff and subsidy reforms negotiated over the last seven years;
2) avoiding the problems caused by countries pursing unilateralism and
regionalism should multilateralism fail; and
3) keeping the WTO's credibility alive).
172. See Memorandum to the President-Elect, supra note 159, at 11 (noting that the President should
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FTAs by choosing to negotiate with major trading partners (the EC and Japan)
not considered before because of the U.S. insistence on the model or with the
large developing countries (such as Brazil and China). 73
Finally, the United States could change its approach to regionalism by
reconfiguring its model into a development tool. The United States provides
more development assistance in the form of Trade Capacity Building (TCB)
than any other country.'74 The goal of trade capacity building is to place the
developing country beneficiaries in positions to achieve economic growth
through trade liberalization.' With the more recent U.S. FTAs, the United
States started including a trade capacity building negotiating group. The
negotiating group, which was turned into a TCB Committee' 76 upon the
implementation of each FTA, was used to provide developing country FTA
partners with a forum for discussing their needs in such areas as infrastructure
projects and standards capability,'77 which ultimately led to the funding of some
reorient trade policy away from the recent FTA strategy, which is "running out of steam," and harmonize
existing bilaterals into broader regional arrangements; the Trade Policy Study Group believes that such a
"reorientation could boost stalled initiatives as the Free Trade of the Americas and a Middle East FTA.").
173. GAO 2007 REPORT, supra note 31, at 22; See also Memorandum to the President-Elect, supra
note 159, at 12 (noting that a higher priority should be placed on major partners (EU and Japan) if the Doha
Round falters; the Trade Policy Study Group also urges that "[t]alks with China and Brazil, and perhaps even
India, could divert from the standard FTA template and focus on infrastructure services, energy and the
environment.").
174. OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP. (USTR), PARTICIPATION, EMPOWERMENT, PARTNERSHIP: SEEKING
SUSTAINABLE RESULTS THROUGH U.S. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING 1 (Dec. 2005) available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Development/TradeCapacityBuilding/2005Global/Sectionndex.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2009).
175. DANIELLE LANGTON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS), TRADE CAPACITY
BUILDING: FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (2007), http://www.
nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL33628.pdf(last visited Feb. 28,2009) [hereinafter CRS Report] (noting
that some experts believe that TCB is necessary for developing countries to adjust to trade liberalization and
achieve trade-led economic growth). See also H.R. REP. No. 107-663 at 21 (2003) (describing trade capacity
building as a critical part of development assistance because it "can be leveraged to generate economic
growth, reduce poverty, [and] promote rule of law.").
176. See GAO 2005 Report, supra note 124, at 27 (discussing how the TCB negotiating group
operated during the CAFTA/DR negotiations).
177. Id. at 27 (noting that the CAFTA-DR group met with each of the six CAFTA negotiating
groups and that each country prepared a "national strategy to define and prioritize its trade capacity building
needs.").
There is no formal definition of what constitutes trade capacity building, but the GAO did compile a
list based on input from USTR and USAID. Most of the U.S. TCB funds are allocated to trade facilitation
projects (business services/training, export promotion, customs operation/administration, and e-commerce
development)-27%, human resources and labor standards-I 6%, agriculture development-12%, financial
sector development- 1I%, and physical infrastructure-8%. Id. at 9, Table 1.
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projects.' The use of this process did produce insight into some of the barriers
that would be faced by the CAFTA countries in their attempts to implement and
live with the FTA. Given the speed of the negotiations, however, no TCB
projects were funded or started prior to the implementation of the free trade
agreement by the Central American countries. A better approach would be to
conduct a systematic diagnosis of the adjustment issues posed by U.S. FTA
requirements for developing country partners during the negotiations
themselves, and for project commitments to begin before the future FTAs are
completed.'79 The United States 8. and the World Bank'8' have the ability and
resources to perform such diagnoses. This new approach to the TCB effort
would require that developing countries align their national development
strategies with the FTA demands. But these countries would be more likely to
make such commitments if they saw that the U.S.-led TCB process would
provide not only the necessary financial resources, but also all of the technical
178. The United States provided $7.1 billion in trade capacity building assistance from 2001-2007.
Latin America and the Caribbean area have received $1.9 billion during that time frame, $554 million of that
figure in 2007. US/TPR, supra note 4, at 23. The Central American countries have received $650 million
in trade-related assistance since 2003 (and it has focused on rural development and poverty reduction).
OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP. (USTR), CAFTA POLICY BRIEF, CAFTA-DR-TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING
PROGRAMS 1 (2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/RegionalVCAFTA/
BriefingBook/asset upload file544_13195.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
The largest recent contributions come from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and focus
on infrastructure development agricultural issues. These include a $215 million dollar compact with
Honduras to upgrade roads and promote agricultural development (June 2005); a $175 million dollar compact
with Nicaragua (July 2005) to improve highways to link producers to regional marketing and a $461 million
compact with El Salvador to deal with promoting education, enterprise development and transport
infrastructure (November 2006).
Not all of the CAFTA countries have benefitted from the MCC program. Although they are eligible
for assistance, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic have not yet satisfied the eligibility requirements for
an MCC compact.
179. The fact that the FTA has not been approved or implemented in either the United States or the
partner countries should not matter. The U.S. commitment to TCB extends throughout the world. It is not
limited to countries with a special trading relationship with the United States. CRS Report, supra note 175,
at 11 (listing financial outlays under the TCB program for 2006-2007 that cover countries on every continent,
except for Europe).
180. The Intemational Trade Commission (ITC) conducts a diagnosis of the impacts of every FTA
on U.S. industries. See ITC Impact Report, supra note 49, at 2-6, 2-12, 2-19. for an illustration of such an
analysis performed for the FTAs with Morocco, Singapore, and Chile.
181. The World Bank did a complete diagnosis of the effects of the CAFTA-DR and what the Central
American countries needed to do in order to fully benefit from the agreement. See DR-CAFTA: Challenges,
supra note 42, at 12. The DR-CAFTA report, however, was done after the agreement. For developing
countries to benefit more fully from U.S. TCB efforts, such diagnostic studies need to be done prior to
or concurrent with negotiations. This would allow the developing country partner to negotiate better terms
within the FTA text and to refine its TCB requests.
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assistance (experts and training) needed to benefit from trade liberalization.8 2
In order to make TCB effective in this way, the United States would also have
to do a better job at assessing the efforts it has already made in this area. The
United States has yet to develop an effective monitoring system for judging
whether projects under the current FTAs are working properly.8 3 Monitoring
and assessing are crucial for developing TCB projects, and an overall TCB
approach, that will satisfy the long-term needs of developing country partners.
One way to improve the TCB process would be to borrow some ideas from the
recent efforts of the European Community. One of the EC's largest investments
in regionalism has been its pursuit of Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPAs) with its former colonial trading partners, the African, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) countries. The EPAs are meant to replace the long-standing EC
preference programs (Lomd and Cotonou) with free trade agreements.' In
2007, the EC completed the first regional EPA with the Caribbean countries,
the CARIFORUM states." 5 The CARIFORUM EPA explicitly recognizes that
"development cooperation is a crucial element" of the partnership'86 and that
the cooperation can take financial and non-financial forms. 8 7 The EPA text
also contains a commitment to funding the development cooperation projects
out of the EC's general budget.'88 Finally, the EPA sets out the cooperative
priorities-the trade capacity building efforts-on which the EC will work with
its CARIFORUM partners.'89 The EC will continue to complete EPAs
182. CRS Report, supra note 175, at 26 (noting that Congress has stated that it wants USAID to
"prioritize building developing country capacity to implement and benefit from special trading arrangements
..... " This would require an emphasis on some programs like trade facilitation (improvements in customs,
SPS measures), improvements in governance and transparency regarding government procurement). Id.
183. GAO 2005 Report, supra note 125, at 29. Since the GAO found that there was no effective
monitoring of TCB efforts, the USAID and USTR have agreed to develop a system for gauging the success
of U.S. TCB projects. Id. at 29-30.
184. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS: MEANSANDOBJECTIVES 6-7
(2003), available at http'//trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/december/tradocI 15007.pdf(last visited Feb.
26,2009); Id. at 6 (noting that "EPAs are an instrument for development by strengthening regional integration
and improving the business environment in a credible and sustainable way.").
185. Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the
European Community and its Member States, of the other part, 2008 O.J. (L 289/1/4), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137971.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009)
[hereinafter CARIFORUM EPA].
186. Id. art. 7.1.
187. Id.
188. Id. art. 7.3.
189. The EPA contains cooperation priorities aimed at the biggest adjustment problems the
CARIFORUM states will face by entering into a free trade agreement with the EC-assistance for
capacity/institution building for tax administration assist with the loss of revenues from tariffs (Art. 8.1 (ii));
support for the private sector and enterprise development and the diversifying exports through new investment
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containing very similar provisions (based on the CARIFORUM model) with
other ACP regions over the next few years. What this means is that the United
States will face another approach to regionalism, what sets out to be a
development-focused one, by its leading competitor. The U.S. model FTA
would be more of a development tool if it made commitments to financing and
to priority TCB projects in the text of the agreement.'9" None of the current
U.S. FTAs have such provisions. A reenergized bilateral FTA program built
around development goals would signal that the United States is as committed
to these issues as the European Community.
and the development of new sectors (Art. 8.1 (iii-iv)); assist with development of and compliance with
standards (Art. 8.1 (v)) and support for the development of infrastructure (Art. 8.1 (vii)). CARIFORUM EPA,
supra note 185, art. 8.
190. None of the recent FrAs have a commitment to provide financing in the text of the TCB
chapters. The U.S. commitment to trade capacity building in the model FTAs is to create a committee on
Trade Capacity Building for each agreement. The developing country partners are expected to periodically
update and provide the Committee its national trade capacity building strategy. In turn, the Committee will
seek to:
I) prioritize projects at a national or regional level, or both;
2) invite donor institutions and other groups to assist in developing and
implementing the projects;
3) assist with the implementation of projects; and
4) monitor and assess progress in implementing progress.
The TCB Committee is required to meet at least twice a year during the transition period.
